The role of governmental "department heads" in the implementation process of privatization: the case of Jordan, 1999 by Nuseir, Mohammed T (Author) & Hinch, Keith I. (Degree supervisor)
ABSTRACT
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
NUSEIR, MOHAMMED T. B.A., YARMOUK UNIVERSITY, 1989
M.S., MERCER UNIVERSITY, 1992
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL "DEPARTMENT HEADS" IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF PRIVATIZATION:
THE CASE OF JORDAN
Advisor: Dr. George Kieh
Dissertation dated July, 1999
The year 1980 marks the beginning of the worldwide tilt
toward privatization as an instrument for economic reform
and development in many countries around the world in
general, and developing countries in particular. However, in
developing countries privatization has been associated with
the idea of liberalization and/or denationalization in which
the role of the government in the economic activities will
be reduced.
Jordan is one of those countries who, in the mid-1980s,
has come to consider the encouragement of the private sector
to have a greater role in many aspects of the country's
economy where the public sector was the dominant player.
Increasing efficiency and effectiveness, and the lack of the
public sector's ability to manage the wide range of growing
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economic and social needs, were the primary objectives of
the government's tilt toward the private sector. However,
the adoption of privatization and the new policy of market
reform is not an easy task in a country like Jordan, where
the public sector was the only provider of the economic and
social needs of the country. Therefore, implementing the new
policy by those public sector officials, also referred to as
administrators, department heads, and public sector
managers, will be the challenge for the new policy.
This study has examined the role of those implementors,
governmental department heads in Jordan, in the
implementation process of privatization. The importance of
their role came from the fact that they are the ones who
will be responsible for implementing the policy that might
be formulated without their participation. So, in order to
examine their role, whether it be positive or otherwise, the
study has identified the factors that generally effected the
overall opinion toward privatization in order to identify
and produce a list of factors that were applicable to the
case of Jordan's governmental department heads and the
degree of the influence of each factor on their opinion.
The importance of the role of those department heads
underline the overall expectations surrounding the new
policy in Jordan. The study, therefore, provides useful
recommendations that could be necessary means for the
policy-maker in Jordan to start with.
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The worldwide movement toward the private sector as an
alternative approach for the role of the state in the
economy has been motivated by the reality that state owned
enterprises' performance caused inefficiency and slower
economic growth in many parts of the world in general, and
in the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) in particular.
Public sector performance has become viewed throughout
the world as a constraint upon economic growth.^ According
to Thomas Clarke, the World Bank insisted:
It is now evident that the public sector is over¬
extended, given the present scarcities of
financial resources, skilled manpower, and
organizational capacity. This has resulted in
slower growth than might have been achieved with
available resources, and accounts for the present
crisis.2
Actually, government, in its broader sense, has always
been judged by its performance as the prime provider of
public goods and services. As Sallama Shaker has put it:
"Governments' choices are usually discussed in the context
^Thomas Clarke, ed., International Privatization:
Strategies and Practices (Berlin and New York: Walter de




of maximizing the objective function, or the welfare of the
population, fair income distribution, and equity.in this
regard. Shaker wrote:
In the 1960s and 1970s, developing countries such
as Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, and Tanzania turned to
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for reasons that
were primarily pragmatic. The objective was to
provide goods and services that the private sector
seemed incapable of producing. However, dissatis¬
faction with the inefficiency and costs of SOEs
has been very strong. Rather making a contribution
to the struggling economies of developing
countries, these enterprises have turned out to be
a substantial drain.'*
Actually, unlike the developed countries, most
underdeveloped countries, the argument goes, gradually and
pragmatically arrived at the idea of "nationalization" as a
strategy for self-defense in response to foreign economic
domination, especially in the post-colonial period.^ As
Archie Mafeje has put it:
Anti-colonial nationalist struggles were essen¬
tially a bid for political power and liquidation
of colonial domination. It was generally assumed
that executive authority would terminate colonial
exploitation, as is shown by the assumptions
underlying the first development plans of most
underdeveloped countries.®
^Sallama Shaker, State, Society, and Privatization in
Turkey, 1979-1990 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press,
1995), 4.
4lbid.
^Archie Mafeje, Science, Ideology and Development:
Three Essays on Development Theory (New York: Africana




For this reason, most underdeveloped countries turned to the
state as the prime actor, both on the domestic level, and in
regional and international levels, for providing and
producing public goods and services and, more importantly,
as the prime source of economic growth and development. This
resulted in the expansion of the SOEs in most of the LDCs
around the world. However, during the late 1970s and early
1980s, many countries worldwide started to realize that the
development approaches of the past, based on large
government, failed to achieve the desired objectives."^ The
perception became that large government or state domination
of the economy, represented by state-owned enterprises in
which so much hope was placed, had failed. SOEs are seen
more as budget drains than generators of new resources.®
Accordingly, efforts have been made in many countries
around the world, especially in the LDCs, to liberalize the
economy in order to provide more economic freedom to the
private sector by eliminating the rules and regulations of
the state in the mechanism of the country's economy.^ a
large shift towards the private sector was witnessed around
"^M. Peter McPherson, "The Promise of Privatization, " in
Privatization and Development, ed. Steve H. Hanke (San
Francisco, Calif.: International Center for Economic Growth,
ICS Press, 1992), 20.
®Elliot Berg, "The Role of Divestitures in Economic
Growth," in Hanke, 24.
®Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan, ed., Privatization
and Liberalization in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1992), 1.
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the world during the 1980s. Privatization took place in many
countries with free-market economies in Europe, Asia, and
Latin America. This trend is likely to continue throughout
the 1990s in many countries in Africa and the Middle East
as an alternative approach for economic growth and
development.
The massive change in attitude toward the government as
the only provider and producer of public goods and services
is now observed in many countries around the world,
developed and underdeveloped alike. However, in most
underdeveloped countries, privatization became an instrument
for economic reform. Jordan was no exception here. For the
government of Jordan, intervening in the working of the
country's economy was not its role. In fact, government
activities in the production of public goods and services
were the responsibility of the government for the
development and the existence of the country's economy.
Since 1985, a large reform package was initiated by the
government of Jordan in an effort to enhance the country's
growing economic and social needs. One of these reform
policies was privatization.
lOMariusz Mark Dobek, The Political Logic of
Privatization: Lessons from Great Britain and
Poland (Westport, Conn, and London: Praeger, 1993), 1.
i^Osama J. A. R. Abushair, Privatization and Development
(New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1997), 143.
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Statement of the Problem
The problem of concern in this study is the department
heads' role in the success of the implementation process of
the privatization policy in Jordan. The movement towards the
private sector and restructuring the economy in Jordan is a
fairly recent phenomenon. This movement was introduced by
the government of Jordan as an attempt to enhance the
country's economic well being and to reduce government
inefficiency and ineffectiveness in managing the wide range
of growing economic and social needs.
The movement towards the private sector becoming an
active participant in Jordan's economic activities has been
influenced by a number of factors. These factors were
summarized by Osama J.A.R. Abushair as follows:
1. Economic Recession and Deterioration in Living
Standards.
2. Growing Budgetary Deficit.
3. The Debt Crisis. ^2
For these reasons, and many others, the government of Jordan
has decided to privatize some of its economic activities.
Privatization of the country's Telecommunication Corporation
(TCC) was the first example. Accordingly, a number of
policies were made to insure the improved environment of
these transactions. Among these policies was the
establishment of a committee that was responsible for
i2ibid., 144.
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insuring the implementation of the privatization policy.
According to Osama, "The government established a special
permanent privatization committee at the ministerial level
to study the most suitable techniques for implementing the
proposed privatization policies. This, in fact, reflects
the importance of the role of those who are expected to
implement the government's new policy which, in the end,
will help the overall process of implementation of the
privatization policy to succeed. As Kenneth J. Meier put it:
Implementation is a bureau's major means of
effecting public policy. Program implementation or
operations provide numerous opportunities for
"bureaucrats" to guide the direction of public
policy. Bureaucrats can become so powerful that
they dominate policy implementation.
For this reason, implementing the government's policy became
very important to the success of its policy. For a country
like Jordan, this issue becomes even more important, since
the decision to privatize was probably made without the
participation of the public bureaucrats (referred to in this
study as department heads). Therefore, the involvement of
policy implementors in different stages of policy making may
assist in the acceptance of these policies. In fact,
insuring that the policy implementors hold favorable
attitudes towards privatization is essential to the role
I3lbid., 143.
^^Kenneth J. Meier, Politics and Bureaucracy:
Policymaking in the Fourth Branch of Government (North
Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1979), 90-105.
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they are going to play in the implementation process of the
privatization policy. Hence, the researchable problem of
this study is the determination of the degree and method of
participation of Jordan's governmental department heads in
the implementation of the ongoing privatization program.
More specifically, the research question that this
study seeks to determine is whether or not the study's
sample (department heads) has any opinion about the
privatization efforts in Jordan. If the group does hold any
opinions in this regard, then this research effort will
shift towards identifying the factor(s) that have influenced
such opinions in order to determine their role and the
degree of their participation in the implementation of the
privatization policy, which, at the end, will increase the
chance for the overall policy to succeed.
Purpose of the Study
The main purpose of this study is to examine the role
of Jordan's governmental department heads, also referred to
as administrators, government officials, or public sector
managers, in the implementation process of the privatization
program adopted by the government of Jordan in the mid-
1980s. The importance of the role of those governmental
department heads come from the fact that they are the ones
who will be responsible for the implementation of the new
policy that might be imposed upon them by the policymaker in
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Jordan. Therefore, the role of those groups of governmental
department heads will be as important as the policy of
privatization itself. However, there are a number of
responses that might influence the position those
implementors might take toward the new policy. This will
also indicate whether or not such policy will succeed. If
their positions are favorable ones, then the chances of the
success of the policy implementation will be increased.
The study critically examined the factors that might
help motivate the positions of these department heads toward
privatization. Identifying the factors which have influenced
public opinions toward privatization in general, as they
found in the literature, will be examined for the purpose of
identifying those factors that might influence the position
of those department heads toward privatization in Jordan.
The main idea was to provide a list of factors concerning
this matter and to identify which factor or factors
contributed the most, i.e., acted more effectively in
directing the positions of the sample study (governmental
department heads) in Jordan. This will help to determine the
role of those implementors in the implementation process of
the privatization policy in Jordan.
Significance of the Study
Not much research has been conducted in the domain of
policy implementation and monitoring with respect to priva-
9
tization of previously state-owned enterprises. In general
the little work that has been done employed approaches other
than the one adopted in this study. All the studies do not
address the particular Jordanian experience but have tended
to be of a more general form. This study is significant in
its claim to address the specific role of government depart¬
ment heads in the privatization implementation process. In
its particularly unique attempt to draw a functional link
between the behavioral attitudes such as government
bureaucrats and the probabilities for success or failure,
this study also claims privatization policies' significance
in its attempt to evince the salient factors that underlie
and shape the attitudes and perceptions of government
department needs towards privatization in Jordan.
For all intents and purposes, this study will guide
government efforts towards adopting strategies that would
motivate bureaucrats to become active players in the attempt
to liberate the Jordanian economy through privatization.
This study is also significant as a heuristic document for
similar efforts to understand and probably predict the
outcome of privatization in other developing countries.
Methodology
The study utilized a survey instrument that listed the
factors found in the literature to influence attitudes
toward privatization in many countries. The respondents were
10
asked to assign to every one of the 33 statements listed a
value ranging on an ordinal scale from 1 to 5 where
l=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=undecided, 4=strongly disagree,
and 5=disagree.The sample population in this study
consisted of all the senior members of Jordan's bureaucrats.
The target population, however, consisted of only department
heads in all government agencies in Jordan. Those
governmental department heads were also called directors and
general directors.
The sampling frame of this study were the
aforementioned lists. Selected individual governmental
department heads were the actual units of analysis for the
study. The researcher solicited the opinions of those
department heads toward the aforementioned factors in order
to determine which of these factors, if any, influenced
their attitudes toward privatization, as well as the extent
of this influence.
The data collection took place in the middle of
December, 1997. Two hundred copies of the instrument were
sent out to the 200 randomly selected department heads. By
the middle of January 1997, 180 completed instruments were
received.
i^Donald Ary, Lucy Cheser Jacobs, and Asghar Razavieh,
ed., Introduction to Research in Education (Fort Worth,
Texas: Harcourt Brace College Publication, 1990), 234-5.
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Organization of the Study
The study will be divided into six chapters:
Chapter I provides an introduction to the study. In
addition to the background of the study, this chapter
presents the researchable problem, the purpose and the
significance of the study and a brief methodology.
Chapter II provides a thorough review of the literature
regarding privatization. The term privatization is first
defined. Then the methods used to achieve privatization are
then explored. The reasons and motives for privatization,
and finally, the role of government in general will be
examined.
Chapter III provides Jordan's political structure,
public enterprise and the privatization progress in Jordan.
Chapter IV specifies the research methodology that
would be used. This chapter would discuss the research
problem, the population, the survey instrument, and the
sampling procedure that will be employed.
Chapter V presents the findings of the study. The
analysis criteria for the data will be described as applied
to the data at hand and discusses the results of the find¬
ings which presents a list of the significant factors that
have influenced the sample attitudes towards privatization.
Chapter VI concludes the study, presenting
recommendations and identifying some areas for future
research.
CHAPTER II
PRIVATIZATION AND ITS JUSTIFICATIONS:
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
The worldwide movement towards the private sector as a
key element in the efforts for economic growth and
development is a fairly recent phenomenon. According to
Pirie, the term privatization has made no significant
appearance in political or economic literature before 1979.1
Although the term privatization has been around for a long
time, the fact remains that privatization has not been tried
widely until the mid-1970s. ^
However, since the late 1970s, the idea of
privatization has taken place throughout the world. As
George Yarrow and Pioter Jasinski have put it:
Massive transfers of ownership from the public to
the private sector have been the most dramatic
feature of economic policy in recent years.
Privatization, in its many forms, has taken place
throughout the developed, developing and post
socialist worlds and seems likely to remain a
iMadsen Pirie, Privatization (London: Wildwood House,
1988), 3.
^Ernst and Young, Privatization: Investing in State-
Owned Enterprises Around the World (New York: John Wiley and
Sons Inc., 1994), 9.
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crucial factor in economic debate for some time to
come. 3
This movement toward privatization has been identified
in many countries around the world, developed and
underdeveloped, regardless of their ideological differences.
According to Robert W. Poole, Jr.:
Privatization is today being carried out by
governments of all ideological stripes. Communist
Cuba has sold a portion of its telephone system,
while Communist China is one of the leading
practitioners of infrastructure concessions, in
both electric power and toll roads.
Among the most successful large-scale privatizers
have been labor governments in Australia and New
Zealand and populist and social-democratic
governments in Argentina and Mexico. In addition,
of course, privatization has been an important
factor in the growth of such Asian "tigers" as
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.'^
In many countries around the world, governments are
downsizing and restructuring. This process of shifting
assets and functions from the public sector to the private
sector is "privatization.
However, throughout the 1980s, privatization has been
seen throughout the world in terms of both the number of
transactions from the public sector to the private one and
^George Yarrow and Piote Jasinski, ed., Privatization:
Critical Perspectives on the World Economy (London and New
York: Routledge, 1997), 477.
^Robert W. Poole Jr., "Privatization for Economic
Development," in The Privatization Process: A Worldwide
Perspective, ed. Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill
(Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1996), 1.
sibid.
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the amount of revenue. The number of privatizations
worldwide rose from 62 in 1988 to 868 in 1993. Most
privatizations, however, have taken place in developing
countries, but the fact remains that developed countries
have gained more in terms of revenue, $175 billion, compared
with $96 billion for the developing countries through the
years 1988-1993.6
Regarding the number of countries undergoing privati¬
zation and the massive worldwide movement toward the private
sector, Ernst and Young mentioned that "privatization is the
great economic transformation process of our time.""^
According to Ernst and Young:
More than 10,000 state-owned enterprises (SOE's)
in over 100 countries have been privatized, not
including the literally hundreds of thousands of
small shops, service businesses, and farms that
have been taken over by private owners. Even the
privatizers are going private....^
However, these worldwide movements towards privatizing
the states enterprises vary from one state to another and
from one region to another. They took different shapes in
terms of the number and the scale of transactions and the
size of those transactions. As Elliot Berg has put it:
6jean-Jacques Rosa, "Public Choice Aspects of
Privatization Policy: Driving Forces and Obstacles," in
Privatization at the End of the Century, ed. Herbert Giersch
(New York: Springer, 1997), 69.
■^Ernst and Young, 3.
Sjbid.
15
The push for privatization comes in different
forms in different parts of the world. In the
industrial countries, it has come mainly through
divestiture-through privatization of ownership and
sale of equity. In the socialist and centrally
planned economies, it has come--to the extent that
it has come at all--in the individualization of
economic activity.... In the LDC's, there is a
mixture of approaches ... but in most of the less-
developed world, divestiture remains a rare
event.^
In addition, the progress and size of privatization
also varied from one region to another. Regarding this
matter, Ernst and Young examined the worldwide experience in
privatization by analyzing the progress that privatization
made in other parts of the world based upon the political
and economic transformation of the former Soviet Union and
Central and Eastern Europe. They provided a general idea of
the geographical distribution of privatizations during the
1908s and early 1990s, in terms of medium and large
enterprises which are the type of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) that might be the potential target for foreign
investors. The progress that privatization has made in
different parts of the world has been examined by Ernst and
Young to find out the number of privatizations by region.
This includes the members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), including Western
Europe, North America, Japan, and Eastern Europe--except
^Elliot Berg, "The Role of Divestiture in Economic
Growth," in Privatization and Development, ed. Steve H.
Hanke (San Francisco, Calif.: International Center for
Economic Growth, ICS Press, 1992), 24-5.
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former East Germany--Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East. Among these regions. Eastern Europe, except
former East Germany, and Latin America were the leading
actors in the progress they made toward privatizing their
SOEs, compared with the OECD, Africa, Asia, and the Middle
East.
Privatization has been considered by many countries
around the world as an attempt by those countries to improve
their economy. According to Berg, "Governments everywhere
are searching for new ways to mobilize resources and use the
resources they have more effectively, and this has fueled
the shift to the private sector.
Definitions of Privatization
The word privatization has been used in different parts
of the world to include a policy or number of policies which
will eliminate the role of the government in the economy. It
has been used in the literature, in a broader sense, to mean
the liberalization of the economy in such a way as to expand
the economic freedom of the private sector.^2 According to
Iliya Harik, "Privatization is a policy process whereby a
^°Ernst and Young, 29-41.
iiBerg, 24.
^2iliya Harik, "Privatization: The Issue, The Prospect,
and the Fears, " in Privatization and Liberalization in the
Middle East, ed. Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 1.
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government reduces its role as an owner and manager of
business enterprises in the interest of other actors such as
individuals or corporations.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
defines privatization as "the transfer of a function,
activity, or organization from the public to the private
sector," and that "...it brings together policy reform,
institutional development, and utilization of the private
sector."
Drawing from this definition in a broad sense, Moses N.
Kiggundu defines privatization as:
A comprehensive economic, social, and political
strategy designed to increase competitive market
forces and to reduce or eliminate market
imperfections by reducing the role of the state
and increasing that of the private sector in the
ownership, control, and management of the
economy's productive process.
Privatization means more than the partnership between
the public and the private sectors or the sale of SOE's to
the private sector. As Ernst and Young put it:
"Privatization can be defined broadly as the transfer or
13 Ibid.
I'^U.S. Agency for International Development, 2 June
1986, as quoted by Moses N. Kiggundu, Managing Organizations
in Developing Countries: An Operational and Strategic
Approach (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press Inc., 1989),
270.
i^Moses N. Kiggundu, Managing Organizations in
Developing Countries: An Operational and Strategic Approach
(West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press Inc., 1989), 270.
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sale of any asset, organization, function, or activity from
the public to the private sector.
Privatization is "the partial or total transfer of an
enterprise from public to private ownershipPrivatization
also understobd as "a set of policies designed to curtail
the sizes and influence of the public sector by means of
selling public assets.
Privatization Methods
The most common methods of privatization that have been
found in the literature are those recommended by the World
Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID). According to Thomas Clarke:
The World Bank suggested the following
classification of basic methods of privatization:
public offering of shares, private sale of shares,
sale of government or enterprise assets, fragmen¬
tation, new private investment in state owned
enterprises, management/employee but-outs, and
leases and management contracts.
Moses N. Kiggundu has suggested that for privatization
to be achieved, there are four common methods which have to
i^Ernst and Young, 4.
^’^Dieter Bos, "Arguments on Privatization" in George
Yarrow and Pioter Jasinski, 45.
i^Mariusz Mark Dobek, The Political Logic of
Privatization: Lessons from Great Britain and Poland
(Westport, Conn, and London: Praeger, 1993), 1.
i^Thomas Clarke, ed., International Privatization:
Strategies and Practices (Berlin and New York: Walter de
Gruyter and Co., 1994), 5.
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be followed: (1) complete divestiture, (2) partial
divestiture, (3) contracting out, and (4) partial privati¬
zation. Kiggundu also added that "complete divestiture of
SOEs is the preferred approach to privatization by the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID)."20
In addition, methods of privatization have been
summarized by Ernst and Young as follow:
1. Auction: The SOEs' assets are sold to the
highest bidder in open bidding.
2. Negotiated Sale: The price and terms of the
transaction are agreed to in direct
negotiations between the buyer and the seller.
3. Tender: Bidders submit sealed bids, which are
opened at announced time, with the property
generally going to the highest bidder.
4. Stock flotation: The governments' shares are
offered on local or international capital
markets.
5. Management/employee buyout: SOE management
and/or employees buy a controlling interest in
the company.
6. Stock distribution: A percentage of shares
(generally in the 10-25 percent range) in the
SOE are given or sold at preferential terms to
employees and other special groups such as
former political prisoners.
7. Voucher or coupon privatization: Eligible
citizens are given or are sold coupons or
vouchers at a nominal price, which can be
exchanged for shares in former state-owned
companies or in investment funds that control
the actual company shares.
8. Joint Venture: The private investor and the SOE
join forces to form a distinct legal entity.
^ORiggundu, 272.
20
but one that preserves the distinction between
public and private capital.9.Build-own-operate-and-transfer (BOOT) agree¬
ments: Such agreements are used mainly for
infrastructure projects.
10. Leasing: The private investor pays the
government an agreed-upon annual fee to operate
an SOE or other publicly owned facility but is
entitled to keep the balance of the operating
profits.
11. Management contract: The government pays a
private operator an agreed-upon free to operate
an SOE or other facility.
However, among all of these methods of privatization,
complete divestiture of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is
the preferred approach to privatization by the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID).^2 According to
Kiggundu, the USAID preferred complete divestiture of the
SOEs because it:
1. Relieves the host government treasury of the
recurrent cost burden of unproductive assets.
2. Ends the need for special subsidies or
incentives for unproductive SOEs.
3. Reduces the role of the state in the economy
and contributes to greater market allocation of
resources. 23
In support of the above mentioned argument, Elliot
Berg, in his analysis of "the role of divestiture in




economic growth," particularly in the less developed world,
has stated that:
State-owned enterprises now account for 10 to 20
percent of GNP in much of the less developed
world. This increase in the size of the state has
become a great problem, especially for a certain
group of economies for which there are not many
sources of growth. Theorists and politicians
claimed SOEs were the leading edge of moderni¬
zation, especially in manufacturing. SOEs were to
generate resources for investment and take control
away from foreign interests, which were resented
in much of the world. The perception now, of
course, is that these SOEs in which so much hope
was placed have failed. SOEs are seen more as
budget drains than generators of new resources.
It was within this context that the growing tilt toward
privatization as an alternative approach for economic growth
and development has been witnessed in many countries around
the world.
Reasons and Motives for Privatization
On a large scale shift towards the private sector
during the 1980s, privatization took place in many countries
around the world with free-market economies in Europe, Latin
America, and Asia. However, a massive move toward
privatization is likely to continue throughout the 1990s in





Governments around the world, especially in the Less
Developed Countries (LDCs) , started to realize the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) have failed to achieve the desired
goal. In this regard, M. Peter McPherson wrote:
The development approaches of the past, based on
large government bureaucracies and centralized,
government-controlled economies, have been discre¬
dited by their failure. Privatization is forging
economic success and stability. Privatization
works because it focuses on the entrepreneur,
encourages individual initiative, and promotes
market-oriented policies. More and more developing
countries are discovering that privatization
produces growth for their economies and greater
opportunities for a broader spectrum of their
people. 26
However, there are several reasons behind these massive
worldwide interests in privatization. As L. Grey Cowan has
put it:
Worldwide interest in reducing the role of the
public sector in national economies is a phenom¬
enon of the past four to six years. The growing
movement to privatize industries, services, and
agencies and the changed conception of government
roles are products of pragmatism: the state-owned
sector is not working, and enormous subsidies to
maintain money-losing enterprises and services
only get bigger. The conviction is growing that
private entrepreneurs can manage industries more
effectively and operate services more efficiently
and at lower cost to the public than can the
government. 27
Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill have argued that
there are a number of reasons behind privatization, with
26m. Peter Me Pherson, "The Promise of Privatization,
in Hanke, 20.
27l. Grey Cowan, "A Global Overview of Privatization,
in Hanke, 7.
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different emphases in different countries. They broadly
discern five generic reasons behind privatization as
follows: Downsizing; Fiscal relief; Improved efficiency;
Depoliticization; and Wider ownership.28
Privatization has become an attractive toll for
economic growth and development. According to Steve H.
Hanke:
Privatization has finally come into the develop¬
ment mainstream as a result of [a] gradual but
profound shift in attitudes worldwide concerning
the beneficial role of the free market and the
private sector.29
Hanke also argued that many countries around the world
have recognized the failure of state-owned enterprises to
generate high rates of economic growth that are critical to
development. He summarized the advantages of privatization
as follows:
1. Privatization increases the quality of goals
and services.
2. It reduces the government deficits by ending
the costly subsidies they pay to keep
inefficient parastatals afloat.
3. It creates more jobs over the long term, and
opportunities for all.
4. It leads to open, competitive economies that
produce higher incomes and more permanent jobs.
28'perry L. TVnderson and Peter J. Hill, ed. , The
Privatization Process: A Worldwide Perspective (Maryland:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1996), 2-4.
29Hanke, 18.
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5. Finally, privatization can be the right step
for the developing countries for economic
growth and development.3°
However, it should be noted that the reasons for
privatization and its popularity may vary from one country
to another and among different parties within the society
itself. In many cases, national governments are not the only
party who can force the decision to privatize. In many
countries around the world, interest groups, political
parties, government officials, bureaucrats, and managers of
the SOEs may vary in their views toward privatization.
The common argument that privatization is always
justified on the basis of economic grounds has not been
supported by those who studied the subject in a
comprehensive manner. Political factors, in many cases, are
an important actor. According to Dieter Bos, there are three
major forces behind privatization. These forces are:
1. Political and Ideological Reasoning. The decision to
privatize on a large scale represents a shift in the
political and ideological beliefs of the society. Large
scale privatization changes the distribution of power within
the society. It leads to new forms of distribution of
economic power between private and public economic powers.
Socialist ways of thinking, for example, are replaced by
capitalist ones.
30ibid.
3iErnst and Young, 9.
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2. Economic Reasoning. Bos has argued that there are
three major arguments for the economic reasons behind
privatization. First is the "efficiency argument."
"Privatization can be justified on the grounds that it
increases the technological efficiency of operations." The
second argument was the "distributional argument" in which
there is a belief that privatization will increase private
capital income in the economy. The third argument was the
"stabilization argument."
3. The third reason behind the decision to privatize
was the influence on the government budget. The direct
effect on the government budget. Bos argued, was the
influence by the deficits and profits of those firms which
are publicly owned in whole or in part. In privatization
campaigns it is often claimed that the government is no
longer obliged to finance those deficits which had been
accepted in nationalized enterprises as the price for
achieving income redistribution or stabilization objectives.
The second argument was that government revenues from
privatization can be spent to finance public expenditures or
to reduce the tax burden.^2
The variety of reasons behind privatization indicates
that there is no single factor or a compilation of factors
that can be identified as the standard made which can be
followed by all countries around the world in their effort
32bos, 45-56.
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to privatize their economy. As Ezra N. Suleiman and John
Waterbury have put it:
It is clear that motivations vary among societies
and that consequently, no single factor determines
the sale of assets by the state. In general,
however, governments may seek to restructure the
public sector or to privatize for a variety of
reasons. . .
These reasons, in Suleiman's and Waterbury's views, are:
1. The growing size of the public sector is judged
to have reached an excessive level that leads
only to inefficiency.
2. Privatized companies will be better managed and
better financed through the capital markets
than through the state budget.
3. Privatization contributes to the development of
financial markets and hence can finance new and
growing enterprises. It leads to increased
availability of funds for industry.
4. Privatization leads to a substantial increase
in the state's revenue from the sales of
equity.
5. Increase in the states' revenue can lead to the
lowering of tax and to the use of the available
funds for specific political purposes.
6. Privatization can promote broad-based sharing¬
holding in society and so be a bulwark against
social disorder.
7. The state in the "new participatory capitalist
system" may help to detach workers from trade
unions; and a weakened trade union movement may
help dampen demand, increase investment, and
facilitate adjustment.
33Ezra N. Suleiman and John Waterbury, ed. , The
Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization
(Boulder, Colo, and Oxford: Westview Press Inc., 1991), 3.
34lbid., 3-4.
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According to Kiggundu, governments are attracted to
privatization for a wide range of reasons, including:
1. Receipt of immediate cash income or foreign
exchange.
2. Promise of future cash income and foreign
exchange.
3. The need to settle foreign debt.
4. The desire to reduce the role of the state in
management of the economy and to control budget
deficits and the debt burden.
5. Encouragement of industrial development and
foreign investment.
6. Development of more active and efficient
capital markets.
7. Improvement of the efficient performance of
economic organizations.
8. Promotion of a political philosophy of
liberalization, improve human rights, and free
market capitalism.
9. Achievement of more equitable distribution of
income, wealth, and opportunity among the
various sectors and groups.10.Response to and quelling of international
pressures.^5
In responding to this worldwide interest in privati¬
zation, one has to mention that the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) has taken the leading role
in convincing the developing countries to view privatization
as a worldwide investment for future economic growth. The
effort has been made by the United States to work with the
international financial community, such as the World Bank
^SRiggundu, 271.
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(WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the U.S.
Department of Treasury, and the State Department to
encourage multilateral development banks to act more
decisively in private-sector lending, privatization, and
divestiture.^6
Because of the U.S. government as the prime mover, and
active support and involvement of the World Bank and other
financing and international development organizations,
privatization is expected to continue to play a significant
role through the 1990s in international aid and
development.
Regarding the United States' involvement and its
support to privatization, Moses N. Kiggundu said, in part:
The U.S. government, through the U.S. Agency for
International Development, has made privatization
the cornerstone of its international development
assistance to the developing countries. It has
established a goal of "at least two privatization
activities in each mission by the end of the
fiscal year 1987, and two new privatization
activities every year thereafter." ... It has
targeted 43 countries: 18 in Africa, 13 in Asia,
and 12 in Latin America.38
Despite the worldwide acceptance of privatization as an
alternative approach for economic growth and development,
privatization, the sale of state enterprises, and/or




divestiture has made yet little progress in the LDCs
compared with the industrialized countries.
Privatization and the Role of the State in the LDCs
Privatization has been used in the LDCs in a very
conservative way more than that of the industrialized
countries. The slow progress of privatization in the LDCs
according to Berg was in part "because of the novelty of the
phenomenon." However, Berg argued that there are other
factors behind such differences. First, in Berg's view, the
motivation for divestiture is very different in industrial
countries compared with most LDCs. The second difference has
to do with the availability of modalities of privatization
of divestiture. In industrial countries, the question of
selling stock is essentially financial: once the political
decision is made, the rest can proceed smoothly. In the
LDCs, this road is not as readily available, for "well-known
reasons." The third factor is that the economic policy
environment in the two sets of countries is very different.39
In addition to these factors, the domestic factor is
also a key factor. As Berg has put it, "The domestic
political constituency for privatization-and especially for
divestiture-is small in many LDCs." Intellectuals, in almost
all of the developing world, are against it. They see it as
"selling off national assets to the power brokers." The
39Berg, 25-6.
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military is often opposed to privatization in most of the
LDCs, especially those of a single-party type of regime.
Bureaucrats also oppose the idea for obvious reasons in
which "they don't want to see their particular interests
shrink away." More importantly, the political risks that
might be associated with heading down this road are very
high. 40
As Sallama has put it:
Clearly, the decision to privatize is itself a
political issue because of its multidimensional
impact on society and the economy. The risk
involved must be calculated and sources of
opposition must be identified and mitigated. One
obvious challenge is related to the political
risk: entrenched rent-seekers can hinder the
process before potential gains are achieved.
Special-interest groups are crucial factors in any
regime, no matter how tightly political power is
controlled. 41
Accordingly, privatization may present an opportunity
for special interest groups to practice their role and
increase pressures on the government, especially when
governments rely more in their support in any decision that
might shift benefits from their own. In addition, in most
less developing countries, economic reforms are more
politically sensitive than other countries with free-market
economy. There are more challenges to privatization in less
developing countries than others. One of these challenges is




bureaucratic body of the government to guarantee the
implementation of government policies. According to Sallama:
"Bureaucrats can derail the implementation of privatization
process by discouraging potential buyers and by creating
public suspicion of government's intentions."^2
It is fair to mention that during the 1950s and late
1960s, the role of the state in most underdeveloped
countries was, in fact, influenced by the weakness in the
institutional and economic reforms at the time of
independence. This, in return, has influenced the size and
structure of the public enterprise sector in most of LDCs.
In underdeveloped countries, the state, in response to
foreign economic domination, has adopted nationalization as
a tool of protection from economic exploitation. In this
regards, Archie Mafeje wrote:
Apart from political liberation, the struggle for
independence also implies emancipation from economic
exploitation and backwardness. In dealing with the latter
problem there are those countries in which the leadership
has chosen basically to identify with foreign capitalist
interests, while reserving the right to use its newly
acquired political power to negotiate for better terms of
economic interaction and distribution of surplus-value. This
is what has come to be recognized as a neo-colonialist
strategy for development. It is the norm in Latin America,
42ibid., 7.
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with the notable exception of Cuba and, possibly, the short¬
lived regimes of Allende in Chile and Velasco in Peru. In
Africa, there is greater differentiation and uncertainty.
The same is true of the Middle East.'^^
Accordingly, state domination as a development strategy
comes from the assumption that it is the role of the state
to protect the national economy. In addition to this factor,
the absence of the private sector at the time of
independence in most underdeveloped countries is another
factor added to the growing size of public enterprises.
According to Anne 0. Krueger:
The contrasting views of markets and government
implicit in the infant-industry nation are
striking. Government officials were regarded as
able to ascertain which industries would eventu¬
ally be profitable and then to provide temporary
incentives for their start-up. These same offi¬
cials would then remove protection--presumably
gradually--as the industry matured. Private entre¬
preneurs, by contrast, were thought to be unable
to start these industries without government
protection (due to externalities or other market
imperfections) but to be able and willing to do so
with protection.
Actually, as privatization has progressed in many parts
of the world, during the 1980s most of the LDCs started to
move slowly toward privatization having in mind that there
might be a government failure to achieve economic growth and
development. Attitudes have also been changed regarding the
^^Mafeje, 19.
“^^Anne 0. Krueger, Political Economy of Policy Reform in
Developing Countries (London and Mass.: The MIT Press,
1993), 48.
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performance of the state owned enterprises and their role in
the economic activities.
However, in the LDCs, mostly in Africa and the Middle
East, the term privatization has been used in the narrow
sense of denationalization of state owned enterprises
(SOEs), while it was employed in its broader meaning to
liberalization of the economy in such a way as to expand the
economic freedom of the private sector.
Finally, as one region of the LDCs, the Middle Eastern
countries are gradually moving toward privatization.
However, the term privatization has been associated with
liberalization and/or denationalization in their both narrow
and broader meanings.
It is fair to mention that, since the general thesis
that the state has a dominant role to play in the economies
of underdeveloped countries, "State hegemony in the national
economies of the Middle East is rooted not in ideology alone
but also in the nature of the economies of the region.
In fact, the role of the government in the economies in
most of the Middle Eastern countries has always been
motivated by political reasons more than any other factor.
As Iliya Harik has put it: "The manner in which the state
thrust itself into the economy leaves little doubt that one
of the main motivating forces behind state intervention has
'^^Harik and Sullivan, 1.
46ibid., 3.
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been political." The state act to nationalize and control
the press in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Iraq,
and many others, is totally political, and has nothing to do
with the development of the economy. Although state
intervention in the economy by monarchical governments like
Saudi Arabia and Jordan, has been limited in comparison with
those of the single-party states.
Actually, because of the political environment and the
fear of foreign hegemony, many Middle Eastern countries
preferred nationalization and increasing the role of the
government in the economy over any other approach. As Said
El-Naggar has put it: "To nationalize is easy, but to
privatize is fraught with difficulties."'*®
47ibid., 3-4.
'*®Quoted, Iliya and Sullivan, 4.
CHAPTER III
JORDAN: GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND THE ECONOMY
Introduction
The establishment of the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan in
its modern term goes back to the late 19th century. Jordan's
political environment, both internationally and regionally
was the background for the development of Arab regional
politics. Jordan, as part of that region, was under the
Ottoman Empire.
The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the late
19th century and the involvement of the western European
powers, mainly Britain and France, in the Middle East played
a direct role in shaping the nature of the region's
political establishment. Under these conditions, the
formation of Transjordan took place in 1921 under the
British mandate. According to Timothy J. Piro:
The Emirate of Transjordan was established in
1921. In March of that year, the British divided
the Palestine mandate along the Jordan River-Gulf
of Aqaba line and named the eastern portion
Transjordan. Transjordan was under the general
supervision of the commissioner of Palestine, and
Abdallah was installed as emir. Great Britain
recognized the Emirate as a nation-state on May
35
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15, 1923, with the approval of the league of
nations.^
Under the British mandate, the political and
administrational system has been created in the emirats
between the periods of 1923 to 1946. Both the political
system "institution of power," especially the legislative
council, and the administrative affairs were under the
considerable influence of the British who represented the
mandatory power in the region.
As Timothy J. Piro put it:
The period between 1921 and 1946 witnessed three
major events that had a direct bearing on the
formation of the state in Transjordan: the
establishment of an administrative bureaucracy,
the establishment of a modern army, and the
integration of the Bedouin into sedentary society
through land settlement--all under the tutelage of
British authorities. Economically, the growth of
merchant-based trade among the prominent families
in Transjordan formed the core of the small
private sector in the emirate.^
The territory known as Transjordan at the time, which
only included the area east of the Jordan River, was carved
out of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I,
in which Arabs, with the assistance of the British, had
rebelled against the Turkish rule.
The Western European powers' involvement in the region,
mainly Britain and France, come as a result of the aftermath
^Timothy J. Piro, The Political Economy of Market
Reform in Jordan (London and New York: Rownan and
Littlefield Publisher Inc., 1998), 20.
2lbid., 19.
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of World War I, and the disintegration of the Ottoman
Empire. British presence in the region was formalized under
a League of nations mandate which also covered the territory
between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean "Palestine."
The territory then known as Transjordan under the
leadership of Abdallah ibn Hussein, a member of the
Hashemite dynasty who had been named emir by the British in
1921, has gradually granted autonomy in which full
independence came when Abdallah was proclaimed king and a
new constitution was established on May 25, 1946. The
current name of Jordan as the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan
has been adopted in June 2, 1949, to include the territories
east of the Jordan River and the West Bank--Palestine--
excluding the territory occupied by Israel in 1948.^
When the British mandate ended in 1948, the Jewish
state had been established in part of Palestine in 1948, and
the West Bank including East Jerusalem formally became part
of the Hashemite kingdom in 1950. However, in 1951, King
Abdallah was assassinated in Jerusalem and the crown passed
to his son. King Talal ibn Abdullah who, in August 1952
because of his illness, passed the crown to his son. King
Hussein ibn Talal, then 16 years of age. King Hussein
formally took power in 1953, and remained king of Jordan
^Arthur S. Banks, Alan J. Day and Thomas C. Muller,
ed.. Political Handbook of the World (Binghamton, New York:
University of New York, 1997), 434-5.
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until his death in 1999. Under the leadership of King
Hussein, the British commander of Jordan's army had been
dismissed in March 1956, and Jordan's treaty relationship
with the United Kingdom was ended in March 1957.^
Jordan Politics
Since its independence in 1946, the Hashemite kingdom
of Jordan has managed to obtain a great deal of political
stability despite the turbulent region surrounding it since
its establishment.
Following the assassination of King Abdallah in 1951
and the deposition of his son. King Talal, King Hussein,
Talal's son, became the king of Jordan since 1952, formally
on May 1953 at the age of 18. Since then, Jordan politics
were totally influenced by the political environment
surrounding it within the region, and within the country
itself.
King Hussein's turbulent reign was remarkably
influenced by the loss of all territory west of the Jordan
River "Palestine" in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war,
assassination and coup attempts by Arab nationalists in
Jordan and abroad, and the state of war with Israel.
However, the most serious period of internal tension after
^The Europe World Year Book, Vol. 1, Part 2 (London:
Europa Publication Limited, 1998), 1901. Also see CIA, The
World FactBook (Washington, D.C., 1997), 242.
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the 1967 war were the relations with the Palestinian
Commando (Fedayeen) which began to use Jordan as their base
for operations against Israel. This ended after the civil
war that broke between the Jordanian army and the
Palestinian commandos in 1970 ended the military presence of
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1971.5
The expulsion of the PLO led to the suspension of aid
provided by Kuwait and other Arab governments, which was
restored after the 1973 war with Israel. In 1947, in
response to the Arab summit to recognize the PLO to be the
sole legitimate spokesman for the Palestinians, King Hussein
later proclaimed his right in the West Bank territory.
However, in a move toward reconciliation with the
Palestinian elements. King Hussein met at Cairo in March
1977 with the PLO leader Yasir Arafat, followed by a
subsequent meeting in Jordan immediately after the 1978 Camp
David accords. In 197 9 King Hussein and Arafat met and
agreed to form a joint committee to coordinate opposition to
the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and in December of the
same year. King Hussein named a new government to include
six West Bank Palestinians.^
Following an Arab league call for PLO governance of the
West Bank in mid-1988. King Hussein ended all legal and
5Banks, Day and Muller, 434-5. Also see The Europe
World Year Book, 1901-5.
6ibid.
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administrative links to the region, discontinued the five
years (1986-1990) package for the West Bank population, and
dissolved the House of Representatives.
In 1989, following the accumulative economic problems
and the increase in the price of basic goods imposed by the
IMF-mandate austerity program, the Prime Minister Rifa'i,
was forced to resign. In the same year, 1989, following a
campaign revealing continued support for the monarchy but
opposing martial law and government corruption, Jordan held
its first national election in 22 years. After the election,
the King lifted a number of martial law restrictions and,
during the first half of 1990, signalled an interest for a
more inclusive political process, meeting with Palestinian
and political party leaders in Jordan in an effort to grant
more rights in return for undisputed acceptance of the
legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy. Accordingly, in 1992
King Hussein abolished all that remained of martial law
regulation appointed after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and
lifted the political party ban since then.'^
In the regional and international fronts, Jordan's
foreign policy has always been described by the moderate
role of King Hussein and the way he conducted relations with
the Arab world and the international community, especially
with the West. According to Arthur S. Banks and others:
'^The Europe World Year Book, 1901-3.
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Historically reliant on aid from Britain and the
United States, Jordan has maintained a generally
pro-Western orientation in foreign policy. Its
pro-Iraqi tilt during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991
was a notable exception, prompting the suspension
of western aid and imposition of a partial
blockade of the Jordanian port of Aqaba to
interdict shipments headed for Iraq in violation
of UN sanctions. However, relations with the west
improved rather quickly thereafter, several
meetings between King Hussein and US President
Bill Clinton yielding preliminary agreement on
external debt rescheduling and resumption of aid.^
In regard to Israel, PLO, and the Arab world, Jordan's
regional affairs have long been dominated by the Arab-
Israeli conflict. The occupation of the West Bank by Israel
in 1967 and the related Palestinian refugee problem were
Jordan’s particular concerns, which both have given rise to
policy disputes between King Hussein and the PLO chairman
Arafat. However, after the peace deal between the PLO and
Israel, signed in September 1993, King Hussein endorsed the
PLO-Israeli agreement and, on July 25, 1994, signed an
agreement with Israel ending the 46-year-old state of war
between Jordan and Israel. Cooperation also included trade,
tourism, banking, finance, and many others. This also
increased cooperation with the United States as its support
to the peace agreement by promising substantial debt relief
and increased aid to Jordan in reward for its participation
in the peace process.
^Political Handbook of the World, 436.
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Normal relations with the Arab world, with few
exceptions related to the 1970-1971 civil war in Jordan, the
1978 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty remained until the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. King Hussein's tilt
toward Iraq in the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis damaged its usual
neutrality style, causing an angry reaction from Saudi
Arabia reflected by the suspension of oil deliveries to
Jordan by Saudi Arabia and froze its diplomatic relations
with Jordan. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, including
Kuwait were a major provider of Jordan's foreign aid before
the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990. However, in what was
perceived as a further effort to rebuild relations with Arab
neighbors, who before the war had a positive relations with
Jordan, King Hussein in late 1993 openly broke with Iraq
and, in 1994, condemned the Iraqi buildup along the Kuwaiti
border. In 1995 he gained asylum for members of Saddam
Hussein's family and showed an anti-Iraq stance which, in
return, assisted in the re-establishment of normal relations
with all the Gulf States. By 1996 he was greeted in Saudi
Arabia by King Fahd for the first time since the 1990 Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait.^
In fact, the political life of Jordan, its internal
affairs, and its role in regional and international politics
were the discriminatory features of the leadership of King
Sibid., 463. Also see The Europe World Year Book, 1905.
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Hussein and the way he conducted Jordan's local, regional
and international affairs. Despite all turbulent political
environment surrounding it since its independence, Jordan
has managed to sustain a great deal of political stability
in the Middle East under the leadership of King Hussein. In
this regard, Timothy J. Piro wrote:
The Hashemite kingdom of Jordan has played host to
numerous coup attempts and witnessed the
assassination of its first king, the replacement
of its second king due to mental illness, the loss
of its most fertile land in the West Bank to
Israel in 1967, a civil war in 1970-1971, a boom
in the economy in the 1970s, a subsequent
recession in the 1980s, and the signing of a
formal peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Despite
all of this, it has managed to preserve the veneer
of stability in the figure of King Hussein ibn
Talal. ... If one wants to understand Jordan,
one must understand the king and his careful
crafting of domestic and international coalitions.
Consequently, the stability of the entire kingdom
has been laid upon the shoulders of this one
man.
However, one might ask what would be the future of
Jordan after King Hussein, having in mind the weight of
ethnic mixture, the growing economic needs and dependence,
and the regional instability. Actually, Jordan's strategic
location and its role in the overall stability issue of the
region, and the development of the new world order in the
1990s, seems to be significant factors that might add, some
can argue, to the general attitudes of the international
community that a change in the status quo of the situation
^Opiro, 1.
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in Jordan will influence the stability of the whole region
which, in return will have a negative impact on the already
unstable Middle East. Therefore, the continuation of King
Hussein's approach through a constitutional monarchy system
is more likely to be the case.
Jordan: The Country, People, Government, and the Economy
Location: Middle East, northwest of Saudi Arabia, East of
Palestine/Israel, West of Iraq and South of Syria
Area: 89,213 sq km
Climate: Mostly arid desert; rainy season in the west part of the
country between November and April
Natural resources: Phosphates, potash, and shale oil
People: Population: 4.3 m. (July 1997 est.)
Population growth rate: 2.6% (1997 est.)
Nationality: Jordanian(s)
Ethnic groups: Arab 98%, Circassian 1%, Armenian 1%
Religions: Sunni Muslim 92%, Christian 8%
Languages: Arabic (official), English widely
understood among upper and middle classes
Literacy: age 15 and over can read and write
Government: Country name: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Government type: constitutional monarchy
National capital: Amman
Administrative divisions: 8 governorates
Independence 25 May 1946 (from League of
Nations mandate under British administration)
National holiday: Independence Day, 25 May (1946)
Constitution: 8 January 1952
Legal system: based on Islamic law and French codes;
judicial review of legislative acts in a specially
provided High Tribunal; has not accepted compulsory
ICJ jurisdiction
Suffrage: 20 years of age; universal
Executive branch: chief of state: King HUSSEIN bin
Talal Al-Hashimi (since 2 May 1953); head of govern¬
ment: Prime Minister Abd al-Salam al-MAJALI (since
19 March 1997); cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the
prime minister in consultation with the king;
elections: none; the king is a constitutional
monarch; prime minister appointed by the king
Legislative branch: bicameral National Assembly or
Majlis al'Umma consists of the House of Notables or
Majlis al-A'ayan (a 40 member body appointed by the
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king from designated categories of public figures;
members serve four year terms) and the House of
Representatives (80 seats; members elected by popular
vote on the basis of proportional representation to
serve four-year terms); elections: House of
Representatives-last held 8 November 1993 (next
to be held NA November 1997); election result: House
of Representatives-percent of vote by party-NA;
seats by party-IAF 16, Jordanian National Alliance
Party 4, Al-Yaqazah Party 2, Al-Watan Party 2,
Al'Ahd Party 2, Jordanian Arab Democratic Party 2,
Al-Mustaqbal Party 1, Jordanian Arab Socialist Ba' th
Party 1, Jordanian Democratic Progressive Party 1,
Jordanian People's Democratic Party-Hashd 1,
Jordanian Socialist Democratic Party 1, independents
47; note: the House of Representatives has been
convened and dissolved by the king several times
since 1974; in November 1989 the first parliamentary-
elections in 22 years were held
Judicial branch: Court of Cassation
Political parties and leaders: Al-Ahrar (Liberals)
Party, Al-Taqaddumi (Progressive) Party,
Constitutional Jordanian Arab Front Party,
Democratic Arab Islamic Movement Party-Du'a, Islamic
Action Front (lAF), Jordanian Arab Socialist Ba' th
Party, Jordanian Communist Party (JCP), Jordanian
Democratic Popular Unity Party, Jordanian People's
Democratic Party-Hashd, Jordanian Unionist
Democratic Party, Pan-Arab Action Front Party
Progressive Arab Ba'th Party, Al-Mastaqbal (Future)
Party, Jordanian Arab Partisans Party, Jordanian
Peace Party, Ansar Party, Ummah Party, Arab Land
Party. Note: in 1995, the Jordanian Arab Democratic
Party, the Jordanian Democratic Progressive Party,
and the Jordanian Socialist Democratic Party merged
to form the Jordanian Unionist Democratic Party; in
May 1997 the following parties-Al'Ahd (Pledge)
party, Al-Watan (Homeland) Party, Democratic Arab
Unionist Party, Jordanian Arab Masses Party,
Jordanian National Alliance party. Popular unity
party, and the Progress and Justice party, merged to
form the National Constitutional Party.
Overview: Jordan is a small Arab country with
inadequate supplies of water and other natural
resources such as oil and coal. Jordan benefited
from increased Arab aid during the oil boom of the
late 1970s and early 1980s, when its annual real GNP
growth averaged more than 10%. In the remainder of
the 1980s, however, reductions in both Arab aid and
worker remittances slowed real economic growth to an
average of roughly 2% per year. Imports-mainly oil,
capital goods, consumer durables, and food-
outstripped exports, with the difference covered by
aid, remittances, and borrowing. In mid-1989, the
Jordanian Government began debt-rescheduling
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negotiations and agreed to implement an IMF-
supported program designed to gradually reduce the
budget deficit and implement badly needed structural
reforms. The Persian Gulf crisis that began in
August 1990, however, aggravated Jordan's already
serious economic problems, forcing the government to
shelve the IMF program, stop most debt payments, and
suspect rescheduling negotiations. Aid from Gulf
Arab states, worker remittances, and trade
contracted; and refugees flooded the country,
producing serious balance-of-payments problems,
stunting GDP growth; and straining government
resources. The economy rebounded in 1992, largely
due to the influx of capital repatriated by workers
returning from the Gulf, but the recovery was uneven
in 1994-96. The government is implementing the
reform program adopted in 1992 and continues to
secure rescheduling and write-offs of its heavy
foreign debt. Debt, poverty, and unemployment remain
Jordan's biggest on-going problems
GDP: purchasing power parity-$20.9 billion (1996 est.)
GDP-real growth rate: 5.9% (1996 est.)
GDP-per capita: purchasing power parity-$5,000 (1996
est. )
GDP-composition by sector: agriculture 6%, industry
28%, services 66% (1995)
Inflation rate-consumer price index: 4.5% (1996 est.)
Labor force: 600,000
Unemployment rate: 16% (1996 est.)
Budget: $2.7 billion, including capital expenditures
of $630 million (1997 est.)
Industries: phosphate mining, petroleum refining,
cement, potash, light manufacturing
Industrial production growth rate: 3.9% (1995)
Exports: $1.9 billion (f.o.b., 1996); commodities:
phosphates, fertilizers, potash, agricultural
products, manufatures; partners: India, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, EU, Indonesia, UAE
Imports: $4.1 billion (c.i.f., 1996); commodities:
crude oil, machinery, transport equipment, food,
live animals, manufactured goods; partners, EU, US,
Iraq, Japan, Turkey
Debt-external: $7.3 billion (1995)
Economic aid: ODA $238 million (1993)
Currency: 1 Jordanian dinar (JD) = 1,000 fils
Exchange rates: Jordanian dinars (JD) per US $1-
0.7090 (January 1997), 0.7090 (1996), 0.7005 (1995),
0.6987 (1994), 0.6928 (1993), 0.6797 (1992); note:
since May 1989, the dinar has been pegged to a
basket of currencies
Fiscal year: calendar year
CIA, The World Factbook (Washington, D.C.: 1997). Also see
The Europe World Yearbooks, Vols. 1 and 2 (London: Europe
Publication Limited, 1998).
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State-Owned Enterprises and the Role of the State:
Introduction
In most of the developing countries, as in Jordan,
there are several reasons for the establishment and growth
of the public enterprise sector. According to C. H.
Kirkpatrich, N. Lee and F. I. Nixon:
The growth in the public enterprise sector can be
analyzed from two alternative, although not mutu¬
ally exclusive, perspectives. The first approach
views the establishment of public enterprises
largely as the result of certain economic factors.
Government ownership of the production process is
seen as a non-ideological response to failures in
the workings of the market mechanism. A second
approach considers the public enterprise sector
from a broader socio-political perspective, and
sees its growth as being determined by the
interplay of political and social forces within
the developing countries.
Therefore, the economic factor has been used based on
the traditional analysis of the economic theory that has
rationalized direct government participation in productive
activities in terms of imperfections in the market economy.
In the socio-political level, on the other hand, states'
practice took two different approaches in which one will be
support and the other will be control.
In the first case, the role of public enterprises is to
provide a supportive role to the private sector, by
undertaking high-risk investment that provide the private
lie. H. Kirkpatrick, N. Lee and F. I. Nixon, ed.,
Industrial Structure and Policy in Less Developing Countries
(London: George Allen and Unwin Publishers Ltd., 1984), 156.
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sector with basic industrial inputs and infrastructural
requirements. In the second case, however, the state assumes
a more independent role, and used control of public
enterprises to pursue ends that may differ from, or be
additional to, the market efficiency objective. This has
been observed in most socialist economies. Public
enterprises may be regarded as a necessary condition for the
establishment of socialism as an end in itself.
The growth and expansion of public enterprises,
particularly SOEs, has been motivated by economic and non¬
economic reasons. Although the reasons and motives for
governments to have a greater role in a particular sector or
industry differ from one sector to another and from country
to country based on the objectives of those SOEs. As Mehdi
Haririan has put it:
Most of the objectives of SOEs are derived from
public policy geared toward the achievement of
some national goals and public interests. However,
these goals . . . are stated in rather general
terms and cannot be stated in quantifiable dimen¬
sions. ... In other words, arguing the national
interest in general form is not problematic; the
real problem is the difficulty of translating the
general and extremely nebulous statement into
precise and quantitative figures. It is here that
the main distinction between a private enterprise
and an SOE becomes more apparent. In this context,
the problem is further intensified by the multiple
objectives of SOEs that reflect political
pressures and conflicting national interests.
i^ibid., 161.
i^Mehdi Haririan, State-Owned Enterprises in a Mixed
Economy, Micro Versus Macro Economic Objectives (Boulder,
San Francisco and London: Westview Press, 1989), 2.
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However, the role of the state, and the growth of the SOEs
in Jordan, like many Middle Eastern and North African
countries, were in fact influenced by the emergence of a
neo-independence political system and the establishment of a
nation-states after the departure of colonialism. Nation
building and state formation were the first priority of the
leadership in Jordan since its independence. In this regard,
Timothy J. Piro wrote:
The institutionalized patterns of policymaking,
government intervention, and the relationship
between business and the state have the process of
market reform in Jordan. A neo-patrimonial
political system exists in Jordan where power is
concentrated not only within the ruling political
elite of the king, his Council of Ministers, and
the security services, but also in the upper
echelons of the civil service bureaucracy. Such a
power-sharing arrangement is not due to regional
traditions but to the rulers' affinity with
projects of nation building and state formation.
The presence of a small domestic market, the
establishment of a central administrative entity and
national market, and the weakness of the private sector,
among others, were the principal factors that led to the
expansion of the role of the state in Jordan. In addition,
the role of the state in Jordan has been described,
according to Timothy J. Piro, as "one of the most laissez-
faire economies in the Middle East, where the state
safeguards and nurtures the private sector." It became.
^"^Piro, 95.
50
throughout the 1970s and into the 1990s, the employers of
the first and last resort, and because of a dearth of
natural resources, and a small domestic market, the state
was the main actor in the society that could provide the
capital to initiate such large projects in the country with
the non-existence of a strong private sector.
It should be noted that the role of the state in the
economy of Jordan, the growth of the public sector, and the
SOEs, were not the desire of the state to be the dominant
actor in the countries' economic activities on one hand, and
the lack of a strong private sector to car2ry out some of the
large investment projects in Jordan on the other hand. The
truth of the matter was, in fact, that since its
independence, the state of Jordan heavily depends on foreign
aid from the United States, Britain, and more from the oil-
producing Arab states, in addition to remittances of
Jordanian workers abroad. These foreign aids and expatriate
labor remittances provide most of the financial capital
necessary for the growth of Jordan's economy throughout the
1970s and 1980s, although 95 percent of Jordan's official
bilateral and multilateral aid went to the government to
provide the capital needed for economic development.
Accordingly, this has led to the expansion and buildup of
more government agencies and, as a result, more manpower to
i^ibid. , 95-6 .
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carry out plans and other governmental projects. This, in
return, has increased the size of the public sector and a
larger state bureaucracy in Jordan. A massive bureaucracy of
multiple government ministries performing similar tasks has
been established in Jordan. The number of civil service
employees increased by 300 percent between 1970 and 1985 and
public sector employees close to 50 percent of the manpower
in the country, and was responsible for half of all capital
investment.
Most of the government expenditures that were financed
by those foreign aids were to provide services and consumer
products to the population more than that of increasing the
productive capacity of the economy. Table 1 shows the
government budgetary outlays and foreign assistance to
Jordan between the years 1970 to 1996.
To examine the role of the state, Osama J. A. R. Abu
Shair has suggested that there are three ways in which the
role of the government can be explained. These are:
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Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Quarterly Statistical Series: 1964-
1989 (Airman: Department Research and Publications, October
1989, 44; Monthly Statistical Bulletin (Airman: Department of
Research and Studies, February 1993), 42. and Monthly
Statistical Bulletin (Amman: Department of Research and
Studies, February 1997), 44. As cited by Timothy J. Piro,
The Political Economy of Market Reform in Jordan (London,
New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1998), 65.
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Government Spending
According to Osama, "The government spending ratio (or
public expenditure ratio) can reveal the level of the
allocative role of the government, in particular when the
expenditure is divided between current and capital."
Government expenditure ratio during the period of 1980-1994
was 41.8 percent of GDP. This high ratio of public
expenditure indicates the level of government involvement in
the countries' economic activities during the years 1980 to
1994, athough the increased government spending ratio in the
1980s was related to the decline in oil prices in 1986 and
the growing economic recession in Jordan. Table 2 provides a
statistical analysis of the government spending, both
current and capital, and its share of the GDP.
An average of 67 percent of the total current
government spending between 1980 and 1994 indicates that the
government activities were more involved in a distributive
rather than a productive basis. This, however, related to
two factors: a high level of defense expenditure, and a
large government wage bill. For the latter, government




















1980 487.9 62.6 37.4 1151.2 40.8
1981 546.2 65.2 34.8 1426.7 38.6
1982 632.0 71.4 28.6 1638.1 39.4
1983 656.3 69.8 30.2 1765.8 37.3
1984 720.8 67.7 32.3 1891.4 38.1
1985 805.7 67.3 32.7 1940.6 41.5
1986 981.3 58.1 41.9 2114.6 46.4
1987 965.8 62.4 37.6 2162.7 44.6
1988 1054.0 63.5 36.5 2264.4 46.5
1989 1102.3 68.0 32.0 2372.1 46.4
1990 1120.1 75.1 24.9 2668.3 42.0
1991 1234.2 73.2 26.8 2855.1 43.2
1992 1348.8 68.9 31.1 2493.0 38.6
1993 1647.7 63.4 36.6 3811.4 43.2
1994 1669.1 67.0 33.0 4190.6 38.8
MJDs: million Jordanian dinars
Source: Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), Monthly Statistical Bulletin
(various issues), as cited by Osama J. A. R. Abu Shair,
Privatization and Development (London and New York: St.
Martin's Press Inc., 1997), 130.
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Government spending in a non-productive sector in
Jordan, including public services and others, is shown in
the last three years of the budget from 1993 to 1996 (see
Table 3).
TABLE 3
GOVERNMENT SPENDING IN A NON- PRODUCTIVE SECTOR, 1993-1996
Expenditure (JD million) 1993 1994 1995
General public services 84.8 82.5 97.8
Defense 258.6 272.0 296.0
Public order and safety 101.1 105.4 121.0
Education 201.2 205.4 227.8
Health 87.1 98.5 103.7
Social Security and Welfare 189.3 187.6 246.3
Housing and Community Amenities 16.2 24.0 26.0
Recreational, cultural and
religious affairs and services 22.3 27.9 31.5
Agriculture, forestry, fishing
and hunting 33.0 53.7 65.7
Transport and communications 71.3 61.4 60.9
Other purposes 131.7 147.4 141.9
Interest payment 122.0 109.4 132.7
Sub-totals 1236.4 1312.8 1471.5
Adjustment -1.3 - -
TOTAL 1235.1 1312.8 1471.5
Source: The Europe World Yearbook, Vol. 1, Part Two (London:
Europe Publication Limited, 1998), 1908.
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Government Regulations
Government rules and regulations in most developing
countries are more important for the investors than that of
government spending. Government used these tools to reserve
the right to single out and promote certain economic
activities.
Government Ownership
During the 1970s, the role of the state in the economic
activities of the country were influenced by two major
factors. The first was the increase in government revenues,
from grants and loans abroad, which created a new and
immense capacity for the government to intervene through the
means of production and became an owner of major projects.
The second reason was the need to build services, an infra¬
structure and a modern industrial base in the country. This
has resulted in a direct participation of the state in
Jordan, because of the availability of capital required for
capital-intensive projects, which the private sector cannot
afford. Additional factors are the high risk involved when
the investment is some project, and the desire of the
government to keep control in commanding height industries.
I'^Osama, 129-40.
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State-Owned Enterprises in Jordan
It is coiranonly known that most of the objectives of the
SOEs are derived from public policy, at the time, geared
toward the achievement of a set of goals that the policy¬
makers seek to achieve, although these objectives did not
occur in a vacuum. Some of these are derived based on an
ideological-political basis, like many of the socialist
types of regimes, and the others are purely economic ones,
like most of the free-market economies, or both, which was
the case in Jordan.
In Jordan, the establishment of the SOEs, unlike the
majority of the developing countries, were based on the
ideological belief of the state in market-oriented policies
and in the effectiveness of the free-enterprise model as a
path for development. According to Osama Abu Shair, SOEs in
Jordan fall under three different categories as follows.
Pure State Sector Departments
SOEs of this kind means these enterprises that are
totally owned, financed, and managed by the government. This
kind of public enterprise is found in almost all sectors of
the countries' economy. They are parts of the ministries and
staffed by civil servants. This includes all ministries and
their related departments and agencies, in addition to, in
part, some others like the "Civil Employees Consumption
Corporation" and the "Free Zones Corporation."
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Autonomous State Institutions
These institutions are parts of different government
departments or similar administrative structures, in which
they are owned by the government but they are legally,
financially and administratively independent. However, the
government always exercises administrative and financial
control upon these types of enterprises. The Public
Transportation Corporation, the Water Authority, Jordan
Electricity Authority, the Royal Jordanian Airlines, and
others, are examples of this kind of enterprise.
Mixed Enterprises
These are shareholding companies in which the
government and/or its related agencies have equity
participation. The government presence in this kind of
enterprises measured by its representation on the board of
directors in which also, linked to the share in the
company's paid-up capital. There are many of those
enterprises in Jordan. An example of that is the Arab Potash
Company, and the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company.^® Timothy J.
Piro has described those enterprises, in his study "The
Political Economy of Market Reform in Jordan" as the "Big
isibid., 140-1.
59
5," and the development of their establishment as a state-
owned enterprises in Jordan. These "Big 5" are:
1. The Jordan Cement Factory Company (JCFC) established
in 1951.
2. Jordan Phosphate Mines Company (JPMC) incorporated
in 1953.
3. The Jordan Petroleum and Refinery Company (JPRC)
established in 1956.
4. Arab Potash Company (APC) established in 1956.
5. The Jordan Fertilizer Industries Company (JFIC)
incorporated in 1975.
Timothy J. Piro has analyzed the SOEs, including the "Big
5," establishment in Jordan, and the role of the state in
the economy based on political background, and stated that:
While the literature on state intervention has
traditionally highlighted the capacity of the
state to drive economic development, the case of
Jordan illustrates how exogenous factors--British
imperial policy, regional Arab relations, the
Arab-Israeli conflict--helped contribute to the
formation and consolidation of state rule, and
created a tripartite alliance among public sector
bureaucrats, the private sector, and Arab capital.
The states' role in constructing these companies
with guaranteed loans and determining who sits on
these boards has made them Jordan's national
industries.
This type of enterprise in Jordan were estimated in 1985 to
be about 90. On the other hand, according to the
i9piro, 37-54.
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International Monetary Fund (IMF), there were 19 non-
financial state-owned enterprises in Jordan (see Table 4).
TABLE 4
NON-FINANCIAL STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN JORDAN
1. Aqaba Railway Corp. 10 . Jordan Broadcasting and
2 . Civil Aviation Authority and Television
3 . Civil Employees Consumption 11. Water Authority
Corp. 12. Jordan Electricity Authority
4 . Free Zones Corp. 13. Jordan Hijaz Railway
5. General Transportation Corp. 14 . Jordan Hotels and Tourism Corp
6. Himmeh Hot Springs Co. 15. Parts Corp.
7 . Holy Lands Hotel Corp. 16. Jordan Phosphate Mines Co. and
8. Hotels Corp. Subsidiary: Jordan Fertilizer
9 . Housing Corp. 17 . Royal Jordanian Airlines
18. Posts and Telecommunication
19. Jordan Cement Co.
Source: IMF (1987, 67) as cited by Osama J. A. R. Abu Shair,
Privatization and Development (London and New York: St.
Martin's Press Inc., 1997), 141.
Privatization in Jordan
It was widely believed in most developing countries, as
in Jordan, that governments were able to take the lead in
identifying and performing economic functions. Government
officials were regulated as economic planners able to
ascertain the establishment of enterprises that were
economically needed for development. This has resulted in an
emphasis on economic planning, through government, to
determine investment allocations for infrastructure, social
services, agriculture, mining, and manufacturing.
sORruger, 49-51.
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However, as Iliya Harik has put it, "Privatization is a
policy process whereby a government reduces its role as an
owner and manager of business enterprises in the interest of
other actors such as individuals or corporations21
Accordingly, the government of Jordan recently unfolded the
process of economic reform in measures allowed to open the
economy for foreign investment, partially lifting controls,
and encouraging the private sector to take a major role.
This has marked the beginning of privatization in Jordan.
By the mid-1980s the private sector role in the economy
was very limited and dependent on government expenditures.
However, the appointment of Zoyd al-Rifail as Prime Minister
on April 5, 1985, remarked the beginning of economic reform
designed to expand the private sector, and privatization
policies were designed to adopt more free market mechanisms
within the economy. The government lifted all curbs on Arab
capital entering the country to encourage investment, and in
1986 presented a plan to enhance the role of the private
sector in which public organizations could be transformed
into shareholding companies. This was designed to expand the
role of the private sector and to transfer ownership and




Actually, the adoption of privatization in Jordan has
been associated with the growing economic problems in the
country throughout the 1980s. The economic recession was
responsible for lowering the standard of living and
increasing the unemployment rate. The budget deficit caused
weaknesses in the economy and lack of available funds for
development projects. The debt crisis and shortages of
foreign currency reserves caused a trade deficit. There were
many other reasons behind the government's decision to sell
some of its SOEs to the private sector, in addition to the
growing economic recession and the pressure from the
international financial institutions, mainly the World Bank
and the IMF, to cut expenditures, and the lack of investment
funds. All these played a significant role in the
consideration of privatization proposals.^3
Since the decision to privatize has been made, and
plans were designed to expand the role of the private sector
and to transfer ownership and management of public
enterprises to the private sector, the government of Jordan
has introduced a list of some of the major SOEs to be the
target for privatization in Jordan, including the "Big 5":
the JCFC, the JPMC, the JPRC, the APC, the JFIC, as well as
the Royal Jordanian Airlines and the Telecommunications
23osama, 144-150.
63
Corporation (TCC) . All these are the type of public
institutions targeted for privatization in the kingdom.24
However, since the purpose of this study is to examine
the role of the governmental department heads in
implementing the proposed privatization policy in Jordan, it
is necessary then to study the implementation part of the
overall privatization program and the role of those also
referred to as government officials, public sector managers,
public sector bureaucrats, as well as department heads, who
are going to implement the new policy. For this reason, "The
government established a special permanent privatization
committee at the ministerial level to study the most
suitable techniques for implementing the proposed
privatization policies. "2^ in this regard, Sallama Shaker
wrote:
There are macro and micro challenges of privatiza¬
tion. The key challenge is in building a sustain¬
able commitment in society as well as in the
bureaucratic body of government to guarantee the
implementation of reform. Bureaucrats can derail
the implementation of privatization process by
discouraging potential buyers and by creating
public suspicion of government's intentions.26
Timothy J. Piro has argued that "the most salient finding
for Jordan is that public sector bureaucrats retain a great





maintain their privileged positions." He also added that
"They and the private sector would stand to lose the most if
real public sector reform were implemented." Although
transforming the economy from one based on imports to one
based more on export promotion, public sector state managers
as well as other elements have resisted moves to implement
more liberal economic measures.
Generally, domestic factors, especially in developing
countries including the Middle East, has always affected
privatization of public enterprises because of the dominant
role of the public sector in the distribution of resources,
and the lack of a strong private sector. All has contributed
to the slow implementation process.
As one of the developing countries, the case of Jordan
is no exception. According to Osama Abu Shair, there are two
sets of factors delaying the implementation of the
privatization program in Jordan. One is an economic factor,
and the second the non-economic factor. However, for the
purpose of this study, the non-economic factor will be the
area of concern. As Osama Abu Shair has put it:
Since public sector employment represents about
one-half of total employment in Jordan, the
implementation of privatization will be seen as a
state retreat from its historical responsibility
and a breach by the state of social contract
agreed between its leaders and the people.
27piro, 70 and 95.
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particularly in the absence of any unemployment
benefits or effective social security system.28
Because of the nature of government structure, and its
related large size of the public sector, a large number of
the working force in Jordan became totally dependent on the
government as their source of income. This has resulted in
the buildup of the general attitude among those people that
any sale by the government to those public enterprises will
mean a loss in both income and power prestige of those
employees. So privatization, in Osama's views, means "a
great gamble for politicians unless there is a careful
policy design and a gradual mechanism for implementation."29
In fact, this is the case in many developing countries
where there is a risk of resistance from within to any
economic reform including privatization. In this regard
Moses N. Kiggundu argued that:
In many developing countries, the public sector
bureaucracy (government and SOEs), which would be
expected to play a leading role in the concep¬
tualization and implementation of privatization,
may be opposed to the policy perhaps out of self-
preservation. Over time, these people have
institutionalized resistance to change, as can be
evidenced by previous policy reform efforts such






Finally, for the above mentioned reasons and many others,
privatization in Jordan has not yet proven to be a
significant progress. Sales of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), including those of business oriented type, have been
described by Timothy J. Piro: "This has proven exceedingly
difficult and the Jordanian government has indicated that it
would 'go slow' in selling off its stock in state




To examine the role of Jordan's governmental department
heads in the implementation process of privatization in
Jordan and the factors that influence their overall opinions
toward privatization, a research methodology deemed
appropriate for this purpose to gather and analyze the data
necessary to answer the question at hand. In this case, a
descriptive statistical analysis approach has been used as
the way of analysis in addition to the exploratory method.
This will be limited to survey techniques.
Definitions
Population. The larger group of which the generaliza¬
tion is made is called a population. N population is defined
as all members of any well-defined class of people, events,
or objects.!
Target Population. "The set of units to which
investigators wish to apply their results."2
^Donald Ary, Lucy Cheser Jacobs, and Asghar Razavieh,
Introduction to Research in Education (Fort Worth, Texas:
Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1990), 169.
20'Sullivan and Rassel, Research Methods for Public
Administration (New York: Longman, 1989), 440.
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Sample. The small group that is observed is called a
sample. "A sample is a subset of a larger population. "3
Sampling Frame. The population from which a sample is
actually drawn is called a sampling frame. "A list of all
the specific sets of units from which the sample is actually
drawn."^
Research Questions
This research seeks to answer the question: Do
governmental department heads, as a group, have a positive
or negative role in the implementation process of
privatization in Jordan by a positive role it is meant the
acceptance be department needs of privatization policies and
the willingness to participate in the promotion of its
implementation and by a negative role, it is meant the
characterized tendency to sabotage any government efforts to
implement privatization policies.
This research is intended to identify those factors
that might have shaped and influenced attitudes positive or
negative, and defined the role of department heads towards
implementing privatization policies in Jordan. These factors
would be identified, listed and appropriately analyzed.
3Janet Buttolph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn,
Political Science Research Methods (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), 174.
'^O'Sullivan and Rassel, 438.
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Population
The population in this study in a larger sense includes
all members of Jordan's public sector officials at the
management level. However, the target population includes
all those who are variously referred to as administrators,
public sector managers, and department heads of government
agencies. The latter group, the group under investigation in
this study, is also referred to as "governmental department
heads.
Sample
The sample which is a subject of the larger population
is the small group this study observed. In this study a
sample of 200 randomly selected governmental department
heads were drawn from the large population under study. The
sampling frame, from which the sample was actually drawn,
was obtained from the Institute of Public Administration in
Amman-Jordan.
A list of all department heads in the country was first
obtained. Since the identified number of department heads
exceeded the target number (200), a random sampling
technique survey participants was chosen.
Survey Instrument Data Collection
Selected individual governmental department heads were
the actual units of analysis in this study. An instrument
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was provided to solicit the opinions of the sample
population toward the privatization effort in general based
on their responses to the information given to them in order
to determine if there is a factor or a number of factors
that might have a direct influence on their opinions.
The survey instrument that was provided listed all the
factors found in the literature to influence the overall
opinions toward privatization in general, in many countries
around the world and those of Jordan in particular.
Therefore, a 33-question survey was utilized (see Appendix
A). These 33 questions were adapted from the literature on
privatization and a similar survey by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID). The 33-
question survey was measured on a 5-point Likert scale from
1 to 5, with l=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=undecided,
4=disagree, and 5 = strongly disagree. This type of scale
(Likert scale) has been used as one of the most widely and
successfully used techniques to measure attitudes. It
assesses attitudes toward a topic by asking respondents to
indicate whether they strongly agree, agree, are undecided,
disagree, or strongly disagree with each of a series of
statements about the topic.^
The survey was carried by the researcher in a field
trip to Jordan during the months of December and January
^Ary, Jacobs and Razavieh, 234-5.
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1997-1998. A number of personal meetings were held with a
number of academics from the Institute of Public
Administration (IPA) in Amman-Jordan and Yarmouk University-
in Irbid-Jordan, as a preparation for introducing the 33-
questions survey to the sample population under study. Dr.
Amal Nuseir-Yarmouk University, Department of Arabic
Language, reviewed the survey in order to edit it and
translate it into an Arabic language as the local language
of the sample population under study.
Data Collection and Analysis
During the month of December 1997, 200 copies of the
instrument were sene out to the 200 randomly selected
department heads. By the middle of January 1, 1998, 180
completed instruments were received.
The statistical method used to analyze the data will be
frequency distribution supported by graphic forms to present
the data such as histogram and/or frequency polygon. From a
frequency distribution it is possible to examine the general
shape of the distribution and to find out the most frequent
score in the data.® Thus, a survey of people's attitudes on
an issue may report the number and percentage of people
falling in different response categories, such as strongly




The survey was analyzed to measure accurately people's
attitudes, beliefs, and behavior as towards privatization in
Jordan. This chapter more specifically reports on the
results of the responses to the 33-questions-survey that
were completed by 180 department heads.
Definition of Key Concepts
Value: The scale of 1-5 used in the study in which 1 =
strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = undecided, 4 = disagree,
and 5 = strongly disagree.'
Frecpiency: The number of responses in each category.
Percent: The percentage of the number of responses in each
category.
Cumulative Percent: The adding up of the percentages of
the responses in the same category, such as strongly
agree and agree.
Data Analysis
A frequency distribution technique was used to
determine the frequency and percentages of the sample
72
73
population response to each category in the survey. The use
of this technique usually involves making a list of
individual measures on a scale with the highest measure at
the top, the next highest second from the top, to the end
which represents the lowest measures at the bottom.
In this study, a scale of 1-5 was used to determine the
frequency and percentages of the sample population's
response to each question in the survey, in which 1 =
strongly agree, 2 = agree, 3 = undecided, 4 = disagree and 5
= strongly disagree.
To measure the frequency and its percentages for the
survey, the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS) was used to analyze the data. The results of the
statistical analysis for each of the 33 survey questions are
shown in the following tables (7-39) and histograms (Figures
7-33) . Each bar in each figure represents an observed value.
The height of the bar indicates the number of times the
value was observed in the data.
74
Ql. In order to stir economic growth in Jordan
there is a need to reduce or at least limit the
growth of the public sector.
TABLE 5
NEED TO REDUCE/LIMIT GROWTH OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 60 33.3 33.3 33.3
2 78 43.3 43.3 76.7
3 15 8.3 8.3 85.0
4 20 11.1 11.1 96.1
5 7 3.9 3.9 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 1. Need to reduce/limit growth of public sector.
The frequency distribution was 60 for number 1, and 78
for number 2. The total frequency were 138 out of 180, the
sample size. The cumulative percent of the frequency
response were 33.3% for number 1 and 43.3% for number 2, a
total of 76.7%. These figures indicate that a significant
number of the sample population supported the idea of
reducing or at least limiting the public sector.
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Q2. Jordan's public holds negative perceptions
of the bureaucracy.
TABLE 6
PUBLIC HOLDS NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF BUREAUCRACY
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 64 35.6 35.6 35.6
2 95 52.8 52.8 88.3
3 18 10.0 10.0 98.3
4 3 1.7 1.7 100.0












1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 2. Public holds negative perceptions of bureaucracy.
As Table 6 shows, the total frequency for categories 1
and 2 were (64 + 95) =159. The cumulative percent were
(35.6%+52.8%) =88.3%. This indicates that a high percent of
the sample population holds a negative perception of the
bureaucracy.
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Q3. Jordan's public is dissatisfied with the
performance of the government's public sector.
As shown in Table 7, the total frequency of responses
to this question was (45+94)=139 and the cumulative percent
was (25% + 52.2%)=77.2% . This factor indicates that a
significant number of the sample population expressed
dissatisfaction with the performance of the public sector.
TABLE 7
PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION WITH PRIVATE SECTOR PERFORMANCE
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 45 25.0 25.0 25.0
2 94 52.2 52.2 77.2
3 19 10.6 10.6 87.8
4 22 12.2 12.2 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
Fig. 3. Public dissatisfaction with private sector
performance.
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Q4. Jordan's public sector has nothing more to
give to the private sector.
As shown in Table 8, the total frequency of responses
to this question was (40+85)-125 and the cumulative percent
was 22.2% + 47.2% = 69.4% . This response represents a less
significant value than the others.
TABLE 8
PUBLIC SECTOR HAS NOTHING MORE TO GIVE PRIVATE SECTOR
Valid
Value Frequency Percent Percent
Cum
Percent
1 40 22.2 22.2 22.2
2 85 47.2 47.2 69.4
3 38 21.1 21.1 90.6
4 14 7.8 7.8 98.3
5 3 1.7 1.7 100.0
















1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 4. Public sector has nothing more to give private
sector.
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Q5. In general, private companies are better
managed than state owned enterprises (SOEs).
As shown in Table 9, the total frequency of responses
to this question is highly significant, with (79+87)=166 out
of 180 and a total cumulative percent of (43.9%+48.3%)
=92.2%.
TABLE 9
PRIVATE COMPANIES ARE BETTER MANAGED THAN SOEs
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 79 43.9 43.9 43.9
2 87 48.3 48.3 92.2
3 9 5.0 5.0 97.2
4 4 2.2 2.2 99.4
5 1 . 6 . 6 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 5. Private companies are better managed than SOEs.
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Q6. Decision making in the public sector is less
flexible than that of the private sector.
As shown in Table 10, the total of frequency responses
to this question was (64+88)=152. The cumulative percent was
(35.6%+48.9%) =84.4%. This indicates that those who fall in
this category are more likely to support the idea of
decision making flexibility in the private sector than the
public sector.
TABLE 10
DECISION MAKING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 64 35.6 35.6 35.6
2 88 48.9 48.9 84.4
3 20 11.1 11.1 95.6
4 6 3.3 3.3 98.9
5 2 1.1 1.1 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 6. Decision making in the private sector.
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Q7. The private sector is better suited to make
difficult decisions.
As shown in Table 11, the total frequency of responses
to this question was (54+73)=127 and the cumulative percent
was (30%+4.6%) =70.6%. This indicates that a significant
number of the sample population responded to this question.
TABLE 11
PRIVATE SECTOR BETTER SUITED TO MAKE DIFFICULT DECISIONS
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 54 30.0 30.0 30.0
2 73 40.6 40.6 70.6
3 22 12.2 12.2 82.8
4 27 15.0 15.0 97.8
5 4 2.2 2.2 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 7. Private sector better suited to make difficult
decisions.
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Q8. Jordan's private companies are better
financed through capital markets rather through state
budgets.
As shown in Table 12, the total frequency of responses
to this question shows that a small number of the sample
population responded positively to the idea of better
financing of the private companies through the capital
market than through the state's budgets. The response was
(35+49)=84. The cumulative percent was (19.4%+27.2%)=46.7%.
TABLE 12
PRIVATE COMPANIES BETTER FINANCED THROUGH CAPITAL MARKETS
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 35 19.4 19.4 19.4
2 49 27.2 27.2 46.7
3 23 12.8 12.8 59.4
4 55 30.6 30.6 90.0
5 18 10.0 10.0 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
35
Rating





As shown in Table 13
in Jordan would increase the
, the frequency of responses of the
sample population to the idea of more revenue to the state
through privatization indicates that a small segment of the
population supported that idea. The total frequency was
(47+52)=99. The cumulative percent was (26.1%+ 28.9%) =55%.
TABLE 13
PRIVATIZATION INCREASES THE STATE'S REVENUE
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 47 26.1 26.1 26.1
2 52 28.9 28.9 55.0
3 42. 23.3 23.3 78.3
4 24 13.3 13.3 91.7
5 15 8.3 8.3 100.0







1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 9. Privatization increases the state's revenue
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QIO. An increase in the Jordan's national
revenue led to the lowering of taxes.
As shown in Table 14, the frequency of responses and
its cumulative percent were (28 + 52)=80 and (15.6% + 28.9%)
=44.4%. This indicates that the sample population strongly
disagrees with the idea that more states revenue led to
lower taxes.
TABLE 14
INCREASES IN STATE'S REVENUE LED TO LOWERING TAXES
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 28 15.6 15.6 15.6
2 52 28.9 28.9 44.4
3 45 25.0 25.0 69.4
4 42 23.3 23.3 92.8
5 13 7.2 7.2 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 10. Increase in Jordan's revenue led to lowering taxes.
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Qll. Privatization would increase public
expenditure without the need to borrow.
As shown in Table 15, the low frequency of responses to
this question (39-52)=91 reflects a 50.6% cumulative percent
(21.7%+28.9%)=50.6%. This indicates that one half of the
sample population supported the idea and the other did not.
TABLE 15
INCREASES PUBLIC EXPENDITURE WITHOUT BORROWING
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 39 21.7 21.7 21.7
2 52 28.9 28.9 50.6
3 42 23.3 23.3 73.9
4 42 23.3 23.3 97.2
5 5 2.8 2.8 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
Figure 11. Increases public expenditure without borrowing.
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Q12. Privatization would create more jobs in
Jordan.
As shown in Table 16, the frequency of responses and
the cumulative percent of responses to this question
(37+48)=85 and (20.6%+26.7%)=47.2% show that the respondents








1 37 20.6 20.6 20.6
2 48 26.7 26.7 47.2
3 42 23.3 23.3 70.6
4 44 24.4 24.4 95.0
5 9 5.0 5.0 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 12. Creates more jobs.
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Q13. Privatization generates a better environ¬
ment for investment in the country.
As shown in Table 17, the total frequency of responses
to this question was (50+65)=115 and the cumulative percent
was (27.8%+36.1%)=63.9%. This indicates that people strongly
agree with the suggestion.
TABLE 17
CREATES A BETTER ENVIRONMENT FOR INVESTMENT
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 50 27.8 27.8 27.8
2 65 36.1 36.1 63.9
3 29 16.1 16.1 80.0
4 29 16.1 16.1 96.1
5 7 3.9 3.9 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 13. Creates a better environment for investment.
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Q14. Privatization eases the financial diffi¬
culties facing the public sector in Jordan.
As shown in Table 18, the frequency of responses to
this question was (38+66)=104, which indicates that 104 of
the sample population responded positively to this question.
The cumulative percent to this response was (21. l% + 36.7%)
=57.8%.
TABLE 18
EASES FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES FACING THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 38 21.1 21.1 21.1
2 66 36.7 3 6.7 57.8
3 47 26.1 26.1 83.9
4 21 11.7 11.7 95.6
5 8 4.4 4.4 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Figure 14. Eases financial difficulties facing public
sector.
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Q15. Privatization reduces the budget deficit
that Jordan is suffering from.
As shown in Table 19, the response to this question
indicates the sample population did not believe that
privatization would reduce the budget deficit. The frequency
of responses was (28+57)=85 and the cumulative percent to
this response was (15.6%+31.7%)=47.2%.
TABLE 19






1 28 15.6 15.6 15.6
2 57 31.7 31.7 47.2
3 49 27.2 27.2 74.4
4 34 18.9 18.9 93.3
5 12 6.7 6.7 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
35
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Figure 15. Reduces the budget deficit.
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Q16. Privatization would relieve Jordan's public
sector from the financial burdens of subsidization.
As shown in Table 20, the response to this question
indicates that the sample population did not indicate strong
support. The frequency response was (32+56)=88 and the
cumulative percent to this response was (17.8%+31.1%)=48.9%.
TABLE 20






1 32 17.8 17.8 17.8
2 56 31.1 31.1 48.9
3 47 26.1 26.1 75.0
4 36 20.0 20.0 95.0
5 9 5.0 5.0 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
35
Rating
Figure 16. Relieves public sector from subsidization.
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Q17. Privatization would decrease, or at least
limit, Jordan's public sector's expenditures on its
operations.
As shown in Table 21, the frequency of responses to
this question was (31+71)=102 and the cumulative percent to
this response was (17.2%+39.2%)=56.7%. This indicates that
the sample population did not agree with the suggestion.
TABLE 21
DECREASES/LIMITS PUBLIC SECTOR OPERATION EXPENDITURES
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 31 17.2 17.2 17.2
2 71 39.4 39.4 56.7
3 41 22.8 22.8 79.4
4 28 15.6 15.6 95.0
5 9 5.0 5.0 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 17. Decreases/limits public sector operation
expenditures.
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Q18. Privatization would improve the quality of
goods and services available to Jordan's public.
As shown in Table 22, the frequency of responses
(55+84)=139 and the cumulative response (30.6%+46.7%)=77.2%
show a significant positive response to this notion.
TABLE 22
IMPROVES THE QUALITY OF PRIVATIZED GOODS AND SERVICES
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 55 30.6 30.6 30.6
2 84 46.7 46.7 77.2
3 31 17.2 17.2 94.4
4 5 2.8 2.8 97.2
5 5 2.8 2.8 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 18 Improves the quality of privatized goods and
services.
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Q19. Privatization may lead to the development
of financial markets which would further funds for
new projects.
As shown in Table 23, the frequency of responses was
(42+88)=130 and the cumulative percent to this response was
(23.3%+48.9%)=72.2%, a significant response.
TABLE 23
LEADS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 42 23.3 23.3 23.3
2 88 48.9 48.9 72.2
3 22 12.2 12.2 84.4
4 24 13.3 13.3 97.8
5 4 2.2 2.2 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig 19. Leads to the development of financial markets.
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Q20. Privatization would lead to the development
of competition in Jordan's markets.
As shown in Table 24, a low frequency of responses
(36+84)=120 and low cumulative percent to this response
(20% + 46.7%)=66.7% indicate low value to this idea.
TABLE 24
LEADS TO DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 36 20.0 20.0 20.0
2 84 46.7 46.7 66.7
3 22 12.2 12.2 78.9
4 30 16.7 16.7 95.6
5 8 4.4 4.4 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
50
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 20. Leads to development of competitive markets.
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Q21. Privatization would result in lowering the
prices of goods and services available to Jordan's
public.
As shown in Table 25, the sample population hold a
significant value in response to this question. The
frequency of responses was (51+87)=138 and the cumulative
percent was (28.3% + 48.3%)=76.7%.
TABLE 25






1 51 28.3 28.3 28.3
2 87 48.3 48.3 76.7
3 29 16.1 16.1 92.8
4 11 6.1 6.1 98.9
5 2 1.1 1.1 100.0
















1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 21. Results in lowering prices of goods and services.
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Q22. Privatization would improve Jordan's
private sector's ability to compete in outside
markets as a result of lower production cost.
As shown in Table 26, the sample population shows a low
positive response to this question. The frequency of
responses was (36+76)=112 and the cumulative percent was
(20%+42.2$)=62.2%.
TABLE 26
IMPROVES ABILITY TO COMPETE IN OPEN MARKETS
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 36 20.0 20.0 20.0
2 76 42.2 42.2 62.2
3 32 17.8 17.8 80.0
4 30 16.7 16.7 96.7
5 6 3.3 3.3 100.0













1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 22. Improves ability to compete in open markets.
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Q23. Privatization would improve the competi¬
tiveness of Jordan's local products in outside
markets.
As shown in Table 27, the frequency of responses to
this question was (30+102)=132 and the cumulative percent
was (16.7% +56.7%)=73.3%. This response shows that the sample
population significantly agreed with the suggestions.
TABLE 27
IMPROVES COMPETITIVENESS OF LOCAL PRODUCTS
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 55 30.6 30.6 30.6
2 84 46.7 46.7 77.2
3 31 17.2 17.2 94.4
4 5 2.8 2.8 97.2
5 5 2.8 2.8 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 23. Improves competitiveness of local products.
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Q24. Privatization strengthens Jordan's local
market.
As shown in Table 28, the response to this question
indicates that the sample population does not strongly
believe that privatization would strengthen the local
market. The frequency of responses was (23+102)=125 and the
cumulative percent was (12.8%+56.7%)=69.4%.
TABLE 28
STRENGTHENS THE LOCAL MARKET
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 23 12.8 12.8 12.8
2 102 56.7 56.7 69.4
3 18 10.0 10.0 79.4
4 30 16.7 16.7 96.1
5 7 3.9 3.9 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
5
Fig. 24. Strengthens the local market.
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Q25. Privatization draws foreign investment and
capital to Jordan.
As shown in Table 29, the sample population agreed with
the notion that privatization might draw foreign investment
and capital. The total frequency of responses was (49+85)
=134 and the cumulative response was (27.2%+27.2%)=74.4%.
TABLE 29
DRAWS FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 49 27.2 27.2 27.2
2 85 47.2 47.2 74.4
3 29 16.1 16.1 90.6
4 13 7.2 7.2 97.8
5 4 2.2 2.2 100.0












1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 25. Draws foreign investment and capital.
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Q26. Privatization draws migrating investment
and capital to Jordan.
As shown in Table 30, the sample population did not
strongly agree that privatization would draw migrating
investment and capital. The frequency of responses was
(40+81)=121 and the cumulative percent was (22.2%+45%)
=67.2%.
TABLE 30
DRAWS MIGRATING INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 40 22.2 22.2 22.2
2 81 45.0 45.0 67.2
3 30 16.7 16.7 83.9
4 24 13.3 13.3 97.2
5 5 2.8 2.8 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
Rating
Fig. 26. Draws migrating investment and capital.
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Q27. Privatization broadens the investment bases
as a result of the availability of funds to Jordanian
private entities.
As shown in Table 31, the positive response of the
sample population is low compared to others. The frequency





Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 37 20.6 20.6 20.6
2 75 41.7 41.7 62.2
3 41 22.8 22.8 85.0
4 23 12.8 12.8 97.8
5 4 2.2 2.2 100.0














1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 27. Broadens investment bases.
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Q28. Privatization improves the private sector's
ability to manage large scale projects locally and
internationally.
As shown in Table 32, the sample population
significantly agrees with the suggestion. The frequency of
responses was (39+92)=131 and the cumulative percent was
(21.7%+51.1%)=72.8%.
TABLE 32






1 39 21.7 21.7 21.7
2 ,92 . . .51.1 51.1 72.8
3 24 13.3 13.3 86.1
4 23 12.8 12.8 98.9
5 2 1.1 1.1 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
60
4 5
Fig. 28. Improves ability to manage large scale projects.
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Q29. Privatization relieves the private sector
from the rules and regulations of the public sector
imposed by Jordan's government.
As shown in Table 33, the sample population signifi¬
cantly agrees that privatization might relieve the private
sector from the rules and regulations of the public sector.
The frequency of response was (49+87)=136 and the cumulative
percent was (27.2%+48.3%)=75.6% .
TABLE 33
RELIEVES PRIVATE SECTOR FROM RULES AND REGULATIONS
OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 49 27.2 27.2 27.2
2 87 48.3 48.3 75.6
3 33 18.3 18.3 93.9
4 9 5.0 5.0 98.9
5 2 1.1 1.1 100.0












1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 29. Relieves private sector from rules and regulations
of the public sector.
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Q30. Privatization helps satisfy the need for
technically qualified personnel in Jordan.
As shown in Table 34, the sample population responses
show that they place a high value on privatization to help
satisfy the need for technically qualified personnel. The
frequency of responses was (55+91)=146 and the cumulative
percent was (30.6%+50.6%) =81.1%.
TABLE 34
HELPS SATISFY NEED FOR TECHNICALLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 55 30.6 3 0.6 30.6
2 91 50.6 50.6 81.1
3 24 13.3 13.3 94.4
4 10 5.6 5.6 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
60
Rating
Fig. 30. Helps satisfy need for technically qualified
personnel.
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Q31. Privatization allows Jordan's government a
greater time to deal with other problems in society.
As shown in Table 35, the response to this question
shows a significant value. The frequency of responses was
(65 + 81)=146 and the cumulative percent was (36.l%+45.0%)
=81.1%.
TABLE 35
ALLOWS GOVERNMENT MORE TIME TO DEAL WITH OTHER PROBLEMS
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 65 36.1 36.1 36.1
2 81 45.0 45.0 81.1
3 29 16.1 16.1 97.2
4 3 1.7 1.7 98.9
5 2 1.1 1.1 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 31. Allows government more time to deal with other
problems.
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Q32. Privatization would relieve Jordan's
government from pressures exerted by some foreign
governments and international organizations and
agencies.
As shown in Table 36, the sample population shows a
significant value of response. The frequency of responses
was (54+84)=138 and the cumulative percent was (30.0%+46.7%)
=76.7%.
TABLE 36
RELIEVES GOVERNMENT FROM FOREIGN PRESSURES
Valid Cuir,
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 54 30.0 30.0 30.0
2 84 46.7 46.7 76.7
3 38 21.1 21.1 97.8
4 1 .6 .6 98.3
5 3 1.7 1.7 100.0
Total 180 100.0 100.0
1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 32. Relieves government from foreign pressures.
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Q33. Privatization promotes broad-based sharing-
holdings in Jordan's society and thus would be a
bulwark against social disorder.
As shown in Table 37, the sample population agrees with
the suggestion. The frequency of responses was (39+77)=116
and the cumulative percent was (21.7%+42.8%) =64.4%.
TABLE 37
PROMOTES BROAD--BASED SHARING HOLDINGS IN SOCIETY
Valid Cum
Value Frequency Percent Percent Percent
1 39 21.7 21.7 21.7
2 77 42.8 42.8 64.4
3 36 20.0 20.0 84.4
4 19 10.6 10.6 95.0
5 9 5.0 5.0 100.0













1 2 3 4 5
Rating
Fig. 33. Promotes broad-based sharing holdings in society.
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Throughout the analysis, it seems that the total
frequency responses and the cumulative percents to these
responses represent the number of respondents who fall in
the same category, whether it is strongly agree and agree,
or strongly disagree and disagree. This helped to identify
the factors that might shape the respondents' attitudes
toward the subject.
Factors That Influenced the Opinion of Governmental
Department Heads Toward Privatization
In response to each question in the survey, which was
frequently distributed, the study's sample does indeed
reveal an opinion toward the subject matter. The overall
response of the study's sample shows a positive attitude
toward the privatization movement in Jordan.
The total frequency distribution response and the
cumulative percent of the frequency underlined the most
significant factors in response to categories 1 and 2, where
1 means strongly agree and 2 means agree. These are
Questions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30,
31, and 3 2.
1. In order to stir economic growth in Jordan there is
a need to reduce or at least limit the growth of
the public sector.




3. Jordan's public is dissatisfied with the
performance of the government's public sector.
4. In general private companies are better managed
than state owned enterprises (SOEs).
5. Decision-making in the public sector is less
flexible than that of the private sector.
6. The private sector is better suited to make
difficult decisions.
7. Privatization would improve the quality of goods
and services available to Jordan's public.
8. Privatization may lead to the development of
financial markets which would further funds for new
projects.
9. Privatization would result in lowering the prices
of goods and services available to Jordan's public.
10. Privatization would improve the competitiveness of
Jordan's local products in outside open market.
11. Privatization draws foreign investment and capital
to Jordan.
12. Privatization improves the private sector's ability
to manage large scale projects locally and
internationally.
13. Privatization relieves the private sector from the
rules and regulations of the public sector imposed
by Jordan's government.
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14. Privatization helps satisfy the need for
technically qualified personnel in Jordan.
15. Privatization allows Jordan's government a greater
time to deal with other problems in the society.
16. Privatization would relieve Jordan's government
from pressures exerted by some foreign governments
and inter-national organizations and agencies.
Table 40 shows the total frequency to categories 1 and
2 and the cumulative percent to this frequency. The
importance of these factors (see Table 38) to the study
sample were indeed motivated by the fact that most of the
respondents believe that there is a need to improve the
economy by all means. Actually, the importance of these
factors comes from the fact that they are the driving force
behind the attitudes toward privatization in Jordan.
- The first factor in order to stir economic growth in
Jordan the need to reduce or at least limit the growth of
the public sector, indicates that privatization is expected
to reduce the growth of the public sector. This may decrease
government expenditure, which in the end will reduce budget
deficits.
- The second factor, Jordan's public holds negative
perceptions of the bureaucracy, indicates the dissatis¬
faction with government rules and regulations.
The third factor, Jordan's public is dissatisfied with
the performance of the public sector, indicates the
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dissatisfaction of the public with government performance,
the lack of efficiency and effectiveness of the public
sector.
TABLE 38







1. In order to stir economic growth in Jordan there is
a need to reduce or at least limit the
138 76.7%
growth of the public sector.
2. Jordan's public holds negative perceptions of the
159 88.3%
bureaucracy.
3. Jordan's public is dissatisfied with the
139 77.2%
performance of the government's public sector.
4. In general private coitpanies are better managed
166 92.2%
than state owned enterprises (SOEs).
5. Decision-making in the public sector is less
162 84.4%
flexible than that of the private sector.
6. The private sector is better suited to make
127 70.6%
difficult decisions.
7. Privatization would iitprove the quality of goods
139 77.2%
and services available to Jordan's public.
8. Privatization may lead to the development of
financial markets which would further funds for
130 72.2%
new projects.
9. Privatization would result in lowering the prices
138 76.7%
goods and services available to Jordan's public.
10. Privatization would inprove the competitiveness of
132 73.3%
local products in outside open market.
11. Privatization draws foreign investment and
134 74.4%
capital to Jordan.
12. Privatization improves the private sector's ability
131 72.8%
to manage large scale projects locally and inter¬
nationally.
136 75.6%
13. Privatization relieves the private sector from the
rules and regulations of the public sector imposed
146 81.1%
by Jordan's government.
14. Privatization helps satisfy the need for
146 81.1%
technically qualified personnel in Jordan.
15. Privatization allows Jordan's government a greater
time to deal with other problems in the society.
16. Privatization would relieve Jordan's government
from pressures exerted by some foreign governments
and international organizations and agencies.
138 76.7%
Note: Sample size 180.
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- The fourth factor, private companies are better
managed than state-owned enterprises, indicates that the
public believes in the superiority of the private sector's
managerial practices,
- Factors five and six, decision-making in the private
sector is more flexible and is better suited to make
difficult decisions, indicate the confidence of the public
in the flexibility of the private sector in the decision¬
making process.
- Factor seven, privatization improves the quality of
goods and services, indicates the general beliefs in the
rule of composition in improving the quality of goods and
services. Privatization will provide this kind of
computation.
- Factor eight indicates that privatization may lead to
the development of financial markets and that will make
funds available for financing new projects.
- Factor nine, privatization results in lowering the
prices of goods and services available to Jordan's public,
supports the idea that through privatization, competition
between the producers will reduce the price of goods and
services.
- Factor ten also supported the argument that privati¬
zation improves the competitiveness of Jordan's local
products in open markets.
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- Factor eleven, privatization draws foreign investment
and capital to Jordan, supported the argument that
privatization will draw foreign investment and capital to
Jordan.
- Factor twelve, privatization improves the private
sector's ability to manage large scale projects locally and
internationally, is true because the private sector is more
efficient in managing large scale projects.
- Factor thirteen, privatization will relieve the
private sector from government rules and regulations, is
true through the development of the free market mechanism.
- Factor fourteen, privatization helps satisfy the need
for technically qualified personnel in Jordan, supports that
privati-zation is more qualified to provide technically
experienced personnel than the public sector.
- Factor fifteen, privatization allows Jordan's
government greater time to deal with other problems in
society, supports the idea that by choosing privatization,
the government will have more time to deal with other
problems in the society.
- Factor sixteen, privatization relieves Jordan's
government from pressures exerted by some foreign
governments and organizations, supports that privatization
relieves the government from foreign pressures and other
international organizations. Support for economic
development and foreign assistance will be much easier with
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the adoption of privatization than with regular government
programs.
These sixteen factors have been considered the most
important factors which support the underlying assumption
that privatization would provide a better solution to the
problems facing efforts toward economic improvement.
Privatization is expected to result in providing more
efficient and effective ways to improve the image of the
private sector and draw foreign investment to the Jordanian
economy. The superiority of managerial practices in the
private sector provide a more sufficient way for investment
to strengthen the local economy. This will lead to the
development of local markets which will in turn lead to a
more productive economy. However, in order to achieve this,
government intervention should be limited. Limiting the rule
of government in the economy will limit the rule of the many
agencies that have been conducting these responsibilities.
The public is always unhappy with the government performance




Privatization has been considered as one of the most
important ways to solve the problems of economic growth and
development in many countries around the world in general
and in Third World countries in particular. Jordan is no
exception here. In Jordan, the government provides all
necessary means for the economic and social welfare of the
country, with government spending as the primary source for
funding all projects and programs. Many different plans have
been adopted by the government, such as the three- and five-
year plans, as tools and systematic ways to enhance the
bases for the country's economy.
One of the latest policies that the government of
Jordan has considered is to enhance and encourage the
private sector to have a greater role in many aspects of the
country's economy, where the public sector once
predominated. Increasing efficiency and effectiveness in
managing the wide range of growing economic and social needs
were the primary motives of the government tilt toward the
private sector. To achieve these goals, the government of
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Jordan explored ways and methods to privatize some of its
commercially oriented operations. This move toward the
private sector is called privatization. The purpose of this
study was to identify the factors that might influence the
attitudes of those who are going to implement the government
policy, the department heads.
The importance of whether or not those government
department heads have any opinion toward the privatization
movement in Jordan came from the fact that they are the ones
who are going to implement this policy and the importance of
their role in the implementation process will be a vital
one. On the other hand, any government tilt toward such
policy may or may not reflect the desire of those government
department heads who are expected to implement the
government policy. Therefore, identifying the factors that
might influence the attitudes of these bureaucrats towards
privatization may provide an important view regarding the
role of those department heads in implementing the
government policy and for the policy makers to be a tool of
analysis to help the adoption of such policy to succeed and
to provide the basis for future recommendations.
To identify these factors, a survey instrument
comprised of 33 questions was distributed to 200 department
heads in the public sector in Jordan. One hundred eighty
completed surveys were received and analyzed. The results
from the survey data analysis indicates that the study
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sample does indeed hold a positive opinion toward the
adoption of the privatization policy in Jordan. However, the
most important factor that influenced such opinion was the
general dissatisfaction of the study's sample with the
performance of the government.
The tilt toward the private sector comes from the
desire to avoid government bureaucracy and to limit its role
in the economy. The government of Jordan expressed the need
to increase the level of effectiveness, productivity and
competitiveness of the local economy by relying more on the
private sector. The policy makers believed that the private
sector managerial practices are more relevant than those of
the government. In addition, the attitudes of these
bureaucrats have been influenced by the fact that they
realized the importance of the private sector in providing
more sufficient ways to help improve the economy. That was
fully recognized by the response of the surveyed group to
the statement: "private companies are better managed than
state owned enterprises (SOEs)."
The cumulative percent of the sample population's
response to this factor was 92.2%, indicating that those
surveyed strongly agree that private sectors are more
qualified to manage than public sectors. This represents a
high significant level of influence upon the attitudes of
the sample population towards privatization in general.
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The second important factor introduced by the data
analysis was the response to the statement: "Jordan's public
holds negative perceptions of the bureaucracy." The
cumulative percent of the surveyed group's response was
88.3%, indicating the public dissatisfaction with the
government bureaucracy. This factor also shows a high
significance level of influence upon the sample population's
attitude toward government performance and the tilt toward
privatization.
The importance of these two factors come from the fact
that there was no doubt that the sample population held a
favorable attitude towards privatization and dissatisfaction
with the government performance, although the degree of
importance of these factors vary. Among the list of sixteen
factors that this study's responses produced, the desire to
give the private sector more role and the need to reduce or
limit the growth of the public sector, and the bureaucratic
practices associated with it, represent the top of the list
of those factors.
The other factors listed in the findings of this study
hold a valuable degree of importance. They played a
significant role in influencing the overall attitude of the
sample population toward privatization in Jordan. Factor
number five, decision-making in the private sector is more
flexible than that of the public sector, for example, holds
a positive response cumulated at 84.4% of the sample
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population's response to the statement: "decision making in
the private sector is more flexible than that of the public
sector." This also shows a certain degree of influence upon
the sample population's attitude toward the private sector.
Factor fourteen, privatization helps satisfy the need
for technically qualified personnel in Jordan, and fifteen,
privatization allows the government greater time to deal
with other problems in the society, presented the support of
the study's sample to the adoption of the privatization
program in Jordan. They indicated that privatization will
help satisfy the need for technically qualified personnel,
and will allow the government greater time to deal with
other problems in the society. This is true because the
private sector levels of effectiveness, productivity and
competitiveness in local economies will force them to
provide highly qualified personnel in order to produce and
compete. The cumulative percent response to this factor was
81.1%. This shows that this factor holds a significant
degree of influence upon the sample population's attitude.
For factor fifteen, "Privatization allows Jordan's
government more time to deal with other problems in the
society."
The sample population believes that with privatization
the government may have more time to deal with other
problems in the society. But the fact remains that the
private sector's lack of experience in many Third World
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countries might have a negative impact on its performance in
these countries' economies. The readiness of the private
sector to take over some of the government's commercially
oriented enterprises and the role of those who are
responsible for implementing the privatization programs are
equally important as that of privatization itself.
For the country as a whole, privatization became an
important step to enhance the economy. The government has
undergone a major step to privatize some or most of its
commercially oriented operation. This move toward
privatization was accelerated with the increasing economic
problems and the growing demand for more private
participation in the country's economy. Throughout the past
several years, the policy makers in Jordan considered
granting a greater role of the private sector to undertake
many of the country's economic activities.
Recoimenda t ions
Below are some recommendations for policy makers in
Jordan to consider in order to have a comprehensive view for
the new policy of privatization.
1. Policy makers in Jordan should realize the
importance of the role of department heads in the public
sector in privatization policy implementation. Positive
attitudes toward privatization on the part of these people
will increase the chances of the new policy's success.
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2. The factors listed in previous chapters are an
important step to be considered by Jordan's policy makers in
order to provide a basis for implementing the privatization
policy. This will help minimize the risk of a bad
implementation of such a policy.
3. The government of Jordan should inform departments
heads in the public sector of the advantages and
disadvantages of any new policy. By knowing important facts
about privatization, department heads in the public sector
will have the chance to make an impact on the new policy and
insure the implementation of this policy as their own. This
sense of ov/nership will lead to a higher level of success
for the new privatization policy.
4. Policy makers should involve the department heads of
the public sector in any discussions regarding privatization
because they see the department heads as the ones who will
implement the new policy. Once the government can insure
full participation and cooperation of the department heads
from the public sector, then the policy makers will have
more time to deal with other aspects of the new
privatization policy.
Future Research
The focus of this study has been on the department
heads' attitudes toward privatization policy in Jordan. Many
121
issues were raised that are beyond the scope of this study.
These issues can be researched for future studies.
1. A study of the private sector in Jordan is needed to
determine its ability to finance the privatization
program.
2. Research is needed to study the impact of a
privatization policy on the Jordanian citizens.
Social and economic impacts are of extreme
importance to the people of Jordan.
3. More research is needed to study the implementation
of privatization policy in Jordan. Identifying the
most effective ways to implement a privatization
policy in Jordan is important to the success of
privatization.
4. Research is needed to study if privatization is the
only solution to the Jordanian economy or if there
are other alternatives to privatization.
APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRE
Directions: The following is a list of factors that have been
perceived to be instrumental in the decision to privatize by different
governments around the world. The aim of this study is to identify
the factors critical to the success of privatization in Jordan. You
are asked to consider these factors and provide your response to those
that best apply. To the right of each item, circle the response which
most clearly reflects your opinion, upon privatization in Jordan.
Response key: SA = Strongly Agree
A = Agree
U = Undecided
SD = Strongly Disagree
D = Disagree
According to your opinion, Jordan needs to privatize because:
1. In order to stir economic growth in SA
Jordan, there is a need to reduce or at
least limit the growth of the public sector.
2. Jordan's public holds negative percep- SA
tions of the bureaucracy.
3. Jordan's public is dissatisfied with SA
the performance of the government's
public sector.
4. Jordan's public sector has nothing more SA
to give to the private sector.
5. In general, private companies are better SA
managed than state owned enterprises (SOEs).
6. Decision making in the public sector SA
is less flexible than that of the
private sector.
7. The private sector in an economy is better SA


















8. Jordan's private companies are better SA
financed through capital markets
rather through the states' budgets.
9. Privatization in Jordan would increase SA
the country's revenue.
10. An increase in Jordan's national revenue SA
would lead to the lowering of taxes.
11. Privatization would increase public SA
expenditure without the need to borrow.
12. Privatization would create more jobs SA
in Jordan.
13. Privatization generates a better SA
environment for investment in the country.
14. Privatization eases the financial SA
difficulties facing the public sector
in Jordan.
15. Privatization reduces the budget deficit SA
that Jordan is suffering from.
16. Privatization would relieve Jordan's SA
public sector from the financial burdens
of subsidization.
17. Privatization would decrease, or at least SA
limit, Jordan's public sector's expenditures
on its operations.
18. Privatization would improve the quality SA
of goods and services available to
Jordan's public.
19. Privatization may lead to the development SA
of financial markets which would further
funds for new projects.
20. Privatization would lead to the SA
development of competition in Jordan's
markets.
21. Privatization would result in lowering SA
the prices of goods and services































22. Privatization would improve Jordan's SA A U SD D
private sector's ability to compete in
outside markets as a result of lower
production costs.
23. Privatization would improve the SA A U SD D
competitiveness of Jordan's local products
in outside open markets.
24. Privatization strengthens Jordan's local
market.
25. Privatization draws foreign investment
and capital to Jordan.
26. Privatization draws migrating invest¬
ment and capital to Jordan.
27. Privatization broadens the investment
base as a result of the availability
of funds to Jordanian private entities.
28. Privatization improves the private
sector's aPility to manage large
scale projects locally and internationally.
29. Privatization relieves the private
sector from the rules and regulations
of the public sector imposed by Jordan's
government.
30. Privatization helps satisfy the need
for technically qualified personnel
in Jordan.
31. Privatization allows Jordan's government
a greater time to deal with other
problems in society.
32. Privatization would relieve Jordan's
government from pressures exerted by some
foreign governments and international
organizations and agencies.
33. Privatization promotes broad-based
sharing-holdings in Jordan's society and
thus would be a bulwark against social disorder.
SA A U SD D
SA A U SD D
SA A U SD D
SA A U SD D
SA A U SD D
SA A U SD D
SA A U SD D
SA A U SD D
SA A U SD D
SA A U SD D
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